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Abstract 
In this paper, I explore the determinants and consequences of the level of assurance that a 
bank selects. Using a sample of small, privately held U.S. (United States) financial institutions 
(banks), I find that two differing types of banks are more likely to purchase more assurance. 
First, larger banks that are experiencing growth purchase relatively more assurance than other 
banks. Second, more complex banks with lower returns on assets, losses, and higher leverage are 
more likely to purchase an audit than a lower level of assurance. This may indicate the influence 
of regulators on banks’ assurance purchasing decisions. I also find that financial reporting quality 
is better when banks purchase higher levels of assurance. Specifically, banks that purchase an 
audit of their financial statements have lower levels of discretionary loan loss provisions, are less 
likely to just meet or beat prior year earnings using discretion, and are less likely to just avoid a 
loss using discretion. Banks that purchase directors’ examinations have lower levels of 
discretionary loan loss provisions and are less likely to just meet or beat prior year earnings using 
discretion. In addition, I find some evidence that suggests that banks that purchase reviews and 
compilations also have better financial reporting quality than banks that purchase no external 
assurance services. My results should be of interest to regulators and other stakeholders as they 
consider the costs and benefits of audits in privately held financial institutions. 
 
  
  
Acknowledgments 
 I am grateful for the guidance of my dissertation chair, Cory Cassell, and the members of 
my dissertation committee, Linda Myers, James Myers, and Jonathan Shipman. They have 
provided untold assistance, motivation, and encouragement. I also thank Cari Burke, Joshua Hunt, 
Jaclyn Prentice, David Rosser, Roy Schmardebeck, and seminar participants at the University of 
Arkansas for providing helpful comments and suggestions.  
 I thank my parents, my brother Dane, and my sisters, Amanda and Megan, for their help, 
love, and encouragement. Finally, I would like to thank my husband, Brian, for his unending 
support and love through this process. 
  
  
Dedication 
This dissertation is dedicated to my husband, Brian Edward Douglass, and my son, Soren David 
Douglass. You are my world. 
  
  
Table of Contents 
I.  Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1 
II.  Background, Prior Literature, and Hypothesis Development ............................................. 6 
A. Voluntary Assurance ........................................................................................................... 7 
B.  Banking Literature .............................................................................................................. 9 
C.  Background on the Banking Setting ................................................................................. 10 
D.  Hypotheses ........................................................................................................................ 15 
III.  Determinants of Assurance Levels ................................................................................... 17 
A.  Model Specification .......................................................................................................... 17 
B.  Sample............................................................................................................................... 23 
C.  Results ............................................................................................................................... 25 
Descriptive Statistics ......................................................................................................... 25 
Multivariate Results .......................................................................................................... 28 
IV.  Implications of Assurance Level ...................................................................................... 29 
A.  Discretionary Loan Loss Provision Model ....................................................................... 29 
B.  Just Meet or Beat Prior Year Earnings Model .................................................................. 32 
C.  Loss Avoidance Model ..................................................................................................... 34 
D.  Sample............................................................................................................................... 35 
E.  Financial Reporting Quality Results ................................................................................. 35 
V.  Robustness Tests ............................................................................................................... 37 
A. Exclusion of Multibank Bank Holding Companies .......................................................... 37 
B.  Just Meet or Beat and Loss Avoidance Threshold Sensitivity ......................................... 38 
  
C. Excluding Banks with Large Losses and Large Negative Changes in Earnings .............. 39 
D. Financial Reporting Quality Model Specification Robustness Test ................................. 41 
VI.  Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 41 
VII. References ......................................................................................................................... 44 
APPENDIX A - Call Report Audit Indicator Disclosure ............................................................. 48 
APPENDIX B - Variable Definitions ........................................................................................... 51 
  
  
List of Tables and Figures 
TABLE 1 - Sample Selection ....................................................................................................... 54 
TABLE 2 - Sample Summary ....................................................................................................... 55 
TABLE 4 - Differences in Assurance Level Groups .................................................................... 61 
TABLE 5 - Determinants of Level of Assurance ......................................................................... 64 
TABLE 6 - Level of Assurance and Financial Reporting Quality................................................ 66 
TABLE 8 - Determinants of Level of Assurance No Multi-bank BHCs ...................................... 69 
TABLE 9 – Just Meet or Beat Prior Year Earnings Threshold Sensitivity .................................. 71 
TABLE 10 - Loss Avoidance Threshold Sensitivity .................................................................... 73 
TABLE 11 - Just Meet or Beat Excluding Banks with Large Negative Changes in Earnings ..... 75 
TABLE 12 - Loss Avoidance Excluding Banks with Large Losses ............................................. 76 
TABLE 13 - Level of Assurance and Financial Reporting Quality Dropping Prior Year 
Assurance Variables...................................................................................................................... 77 
FIGURE 1 - Mean Assurance Level by State ............................................................................... 79 
FIGURE 2 - Mean Assurance Group by Federal Reserve District ............................................... 80 
1 
 
I.  Introduction 
The 2008 financial crisis highlighted the critical role of financial institutions (banks) in 
the health of the United States (U.S.) economy. Although some banks are arguably “too big to 
fail,” community banks comprise 98 percent of banks in the U.S., with more than 6,000 
institutions, according to the Independent Community Bankers of America. As of 2011, most of 
these banks have total assets under $500 million (78 percent) and are privately held (84 
percent)(FDIC 2012). These banks are particularly important in certain sectors of the economy. 
Start-ups, farms, and small businesses all frequently rely on community banks rather than on 
national banks for lending services (Kahn et al. 2003). In the U.S., all banks are required by the 
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council to file a Quarterly Report of Condition and 
Income, or call report, regardless of whether the bank is publicly traded or privately held. The 
call report contains a wealth of financial and other information at a very detailed level, giving 
researchers insight into a relatively unexamined portion of the U.S. economy: privately held 
banks.  
Unlike publicly traded companies or large banks, privately held U.S. banks with less than 
$500 million in total assets are not required by federal regulations to have an independent audit 
of their financial statements.1 However, all banks are required to disclose the level of assurance 
they purchase on an annual basis. This level of assurance disclosure has nine options, ranging 
from “no external assurance work” to an “independent audit of the bank in accordance with 
generally accepted auditing standards by a certified public accounting firm which submits a 
                                                 
1 Some states mandate a minimum level of assurance, such as a directors’ examination. Other 
states have a lower threshold for an audit than the federal level of $500 million. Because of this, I 
eliminate all observations from states where more than 95 percent of observations are audits at 
the bank or holding company level from my determinants tests. 
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report on the bank.” To my knowledge, this paper is the first to examine the determinants and 
consequences associated with the levels of assurance purchased by privately held banks. Given 
the importance of the banking sector to the strength of the U.S. economy, it is important to 
understand the role of assurance and the outcomes associated with the varying levels of 
assurance banks select when given the choice.  
Outside of regulatory requirements, the assurance provided by an independent financial 
statement audit has potential economic value. Prior literature generally examines the value of an 
audit in the setting of non-banking privately held companies. The literature considers the choice 
to purchase an audit a signal of quality that allows high quality companies to differentiate 
themselves (Jensen et al. 1976; Melumad and Thoman 1990). Several studies find that privately 
held companies with independently audited financial statements have reduced interest rates on 
bank loans (Blackwell et al. 1998; Cassar and Minnis 2011; Kausar et al. 2015). Cassar and 
Minnis (2011) find that audited financial statements are more informative than unaudited 
statements and lenders place more weight on audited financial statements. Companies that have 
audited financial statements are also less likely to be denied credit (Allee and Yohn 2009). 
Because prior literature has not examined assurance choice in banks, I first investigate the 
determinants of the level of assurance a bank purchases. Based on prior literature, I expect larger 
banks, those with more risk, and higher leverage to purchase higher levels of assurance (Chow 
1982; Hay and Davis 2004). Banks are regularly examined by state and federal regulators, who 
rate the banks based on their risk profile, managerial capability, and earnings. If a bank is 
performing poorly, it is subject to additional regulatory scrutiny and regulators may recommend 
that the bank purchase an audit. I therefore expect riskier banks, those with losses and negative 
changes in ROA and Tier 1 capital ratio to have higher levels of assurance. 
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The relation between assurance and financial reporting quality of privately held banks has 
not been examined in the literature. In particular, the role of assurance levels other than an audit 
have rarely been examined in archival accounting literature. I examine whether the purchase of 
assurance services (e.g. audit, bank directors’ examination2, review, or compilation) is associated 
with financial reporting quality. The ownership of privately held banks is less diffuse than that of 
publicly traded banks, and therefore shareholders of private banks are more likely to participate 
in bank management than those of publicly traded banks (Beatty et al. 2002). This results in 
lower information asymmetry for the shareholders of privately held banks than shareholders of 
publicly traded companies. This does not preclude the management of private banks from 
manipulating its earnings, however. Beatty et al. (2002) find that, while privately held banks 
manipulate earnings to a lesser extent than publicly traded banks, they have significantly fewer 
small negative changes in earnings than expected. They also find that abnormal loan loss 
provisions are more income increasing for private banks with small decreases in earnings than 
private banks that have small increases in earnings (Beatty et al. 2002).  
Private banks that manage their earnings are likely concerned with regulatory and 
creditor scrutiny of financial statements rather than that of shareholders (Kanagaretnam et al. 
2003). Bank regulators are specifically concerned with “the level and trend of earnings” and poor 
                                                 
2 A bank directors’ examination is an agreed upon procedures engagement wherein the certified 
public accountant or state auditor performs a variety of procedures and reports back to the board 
of directors and bank management on their findings. No opinion is issued and the procedures 
performed can vary from bank to bank and year to year. In 2015, Eide Bailly, a regional 
accounting firm with banking expertise, advertised directors’ examination procedures as 
“including loan confirmations, reconciliations of subsidiary ledgers, confirmations on 
correspondent bank accounts, reviews to reconcile items on bank statements, allowance for loan 
loss methodology, high level analytics on income statements, operational year-over-year 
reviews, employee account reviews, and additional procedures.” 
https://www.eidebailly.com/industries/financial-institutions/audit-assurance/directors-
examination/ 
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financial performance is sufficient to warrant additional regulatory oversight and potential FDIC 
bank closure.3 Banks also seek creditors in the form of large uninsured certificates of deposit, but 
the market for uninsured deposits prices bank risk (Hannan and Hanweck 1988). Therefore, 
banks that keep their perceived risk of default low can borrow at a lower rate. In addition, banks 
with smoother earnings and higher capital have less frequent regulatory audits (Kanagaretnam et 
al. 2003). Banks therefore have several incentives to smooth earnings and avoid losses. 
However, a bank discovered to be manipulating its earnings would be at risk for increased 
regulatory scrutiny, fines, and penalties. Consistent with earnings manipulation being an 
important regulatory issue for privately held banks, regulators have taken a more punitive 
approach to regulatory non-compliance since the financial crisis, with low tolerance for non-
compliance.4  
I test the association between level of assurance and three proxies for earnings 
management: discretionary loan loss provisions, managing earnings to just meet or beat prior 
year’s earnings, and managing earnings to avoid a loss. Numerous studies have found that banks 
use the loan loss provision to manage or smooth earnings (Beatty et al. 1995; Beatty and Harris 
1998; Beatty et al. 2002; Kanagaretnam et al. 2003; Jin et al. 2011). I expect that higher levels of 
assurance will be associated with lower levels of discretionary loan loss provisions because the 
additional scrutiny by external certified public accountants constrains the ability of managers to 
use accruals to manage earnings. I also expect that the propensity to meet or beat prior year 
earnings or avoid a loss using discretion will be negatively associated with higher levels of 
assurance.  
                                                 
3 FDIC Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-900.html 
4 http://www.bakertilly.com/insights/regulatory-non-compliance-is-now-a-financial-matter/ 
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Using a sample of 81,358 bank-year observations from 2000 through 2012, I find that 
there are two types of banks that purchase higher levels of assurance than other banks. First, 
more complex banks with poorer financial performance (loss companies and those with lower 
levels of ROA) and newer banks are more likely to have higher levels of assurance on average. 
These findings suggest that regulatory pressure may contribute to the audit decision for many 
banks that are not required by statute to have an audit. This is because banks with poor financial 
performance are subject to greater regulatory scrutiny and pressure to have an independent audit 
of the financial statements. Second, larger banks that are experiencing growth are more likely to 
purchase higher levels of assurance than other banks. This suggests that well managed, growing 
banks may purchase more assurance in order to lessen regulatory scrutiny and obtain additional 
uninsured deposits (Kanagaretnam et al. 2003; Lo 2015). 
In my tests of financial reporting quality outcomes, I find that higher levels of assurance 
are generally associated with lower levels of discretionary loan loss provisions and a lower 
probability of just meeting or beating prior year earnings using discretion. Banks receiving a 
review or compilation, a bank directors’ examination, or an audit are significantly less likely to 
manage earnings using the discretionary loan loss provision than banks that receive no assurance. 
Banks with an audit or directors’ examination are significantly less likely to just meet or beat 
prior year earnings using discretion than banks that purchase no assurance. I find no evidence 
that banks purchasing a review or compilation are less likely to just meet or beat earnings than 
banks that purchase no assurance. I find some evidence of an association between the level of 
assurance purchased by a bank and its probability of just avoiding a loss using discretion. Banks 
that purchase audits are marginally less likely to just avoid a loss using discretion. This finding 
may indicate that the positive assurance provided by an audit, rather than the negative assurance 
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provided by a directors’ examination or review, is more successful at constraining management’s 
propensity to manage earnings to meet certain targets. Taken together, my results indicate that 
higher levels of assurance are associated with better financial reporting quality, even in an 
environment that is very highly regulated.  
To date, the accounting literature on the value of an audit has primarily focused on 
nonbanking companies, ignoring a key component of our economy that has a very different 
regulatory environment. In addition, the value of assurance other than an audit has rarely been 
examined. Banking literature has primarily focused on audits of publicly traded banks, rather 
than the variation of assurance that is available to private banks. My findings provide evidence 
that audits are associated with better financial reporting quality than other types of assurance, 
even in the highly regulated bank environment. Banks that purchase directors’ examinations and, 
in some cases, reviews and compilations also have better financial reporting quality than banks 
that purchase no assurance. These findings should be of interest to financial institutions, 
regulators, and others interested in audit choice and the effect of assurance on financial reporting 
quality. In particular, bank regulators may be interested in my results that show that banks that 
purchase audits have better financial reporting quality than those that purchase directors’ 
examinations, the next most common level of assurance purchased by banks. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, I discuss the auditing 
requirements for banks, review prior literature, and develop my hypotheses. Section 3 contains 
the research design, sample, and results for my determinants test. Section 4 contains the main 
research design, sample, and results. Section 5 contains additional analyses and Section 6 
concludes. 
II.  Background, Prior Literature, and Hypothesis Development 
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A. Voluntary Assurance 
While most publicly traded companies in the United States must purchase an audit due to 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations, privately held companies in the United 
States are generally not required to purchase an audit. However, there are many reasons why a 
private company might choose to have an audit even when one is not required. Audits improve 
the quality of financial statements and the choice to have an audit is a signal that allows high 
quality companies to differentiate themselves (Jensen et al. 1976; Chow 1982; Melumad and 
Thoman 1990; Hay and Davis 2004).  
Many studies of voluntary assurance in the literature focus on the cost of debt in private 
companies and view banks as monitors rather than as companies that themselves might purchase 
an audit (Blackwell et al. 1998; Cassar and Minnis 2011; Kim et al. 2011). Monitoring and 
bonding is perhaps the most frequent reason cited in the literature for privately held companies to 
purchase an audit. Auditors mitigate the risks associated with high agency costs (Jensen et al. 
1976; Anderson et al. 1993; Hope et al. 2012) and can lower the cost of debt (Blackwell et al. 
1998; Mansi et al. 2004; Allee and Yohn 2009; Cassar and Minnis 2011; Kim et al. 2011). 
Blackwell et al. (1998) find that small private companies receive lower interest rates on debt 
when they purchase an audit. They also find that audited companies in their sample are riskier 
than unaudited companies, which they suggest means that riskier companies can purchase a 
lower interest rate via an independent audit of their financial statements. Related to Blackwell et 
al. (1998), Cassar and Minnis (2011) find that audited companies have a lower cost of debt 
because audited accruals are better predictors of future cash flows than the accruals of companies 
that are not audited. They also find that lenders place more weight on audited financial 
information than they do on unaudited financial information. When audits are made voluntary for 
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some companies in the United Kingdom, companies that choose to no longer receive audits are 
penalized with downgrades to their credit rating (Lennox and Pittman 2011). Taken together, this 
stream of literature suggests that audits serve as a monitoring tool for parties outside of the 
company such as creditors and credit rating agencies. 
Auditors are perceived as having “deep pockets,” particularly larger audit firms, and 
outside investors and stakeholders may demand an audit or a high quality audit as a way of 
insuring themselves against potential losses. General evidence in support of this theory is 
common in the accounting literature. Audit fees depend both on the actual work performed and 
the insurance value of the auditor’s wealth in the case of an audit failure (Dye 1993). Menon and 
Williams (1994) find that investors price the right to recover losses from the auditor as a 
component of the stock price. Companies with higher agency costs are more likely to hire a 
larger auditor and the stock market responds more favorably to a switch to a large auditor than to 
a switch to small auditor (Lennox 1999).  
Consistent with the various benefits of assurance, prior work provides evidence 
suggesting that a large number of companies purchase assurance, even when they are not 
required to do so. A study in the United Kingdom in the lead up to the change in that country’s 
audit thresholds finds that 63 percent of small companies would choose to have an audit even if 
they were exempt from the requirement (Collis, Jarvis, and Skerratt 2004). Small private 
companies in Finland which experience financial distress are more likely to have a financial 
statement audit (Niemi et al. 2012). In a study of New Zealand companies with the choice to 
have an audit, approximately 80 percent choose to be audited (Hay and Davis 2004). They also 
find that larger companies and those with a higher proportion of salary expense as a proportion 
of revenue and a higher proportion of debt as a percentage of assets are more likely to obtain an 
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audit. Those same companies are also more likely to select larger audit firms and to select 
chartered accountants to perform the audit.  
B.  Banking Literature 
Several studies have taken advantage of the unique setting and wealth of data available 
for both public and private banks as an opportunity to directly compare publicly and privately 
held entities. Beatty et al. (2002) find that publicly traded banks are more likely than privately 
held banks to manage earnings to avoid an earnings decline. Publicly traded banks are also more 
likely to use the loan loss provision to manipulate earnings and tend to have longer strings of 
earnings increases. The authors attribute this difference to publicly traded bank shareholders’ 
reliance on earnings-based performance evaluations. In contrast, Nichols et al. (2009) find that 
there is a greater demand for conservatism in publicly traded banks than in privately held banks, 
due to higher agency costs. They show that publicly traded banks are timelier in their recognition 
of losses than privately held banks, and tend to have larger and timelier loan losses.  
Other bank specific audit research has examined the impact that different types of 
auditors, such as banking specialists or Big 4 audit firms, have on the financial reporting quality 
of banks. Specialist auditors moderate bank managers’ use of the loan loss provision to smooth 
earnings and are particularly more effective at constraining income increasing earnings 
management (DeBoskey and Jiang 2012). Jin et al. (2011) find that, among troubled banks, those 
that are audited by Big 4 auditors and specialist auditors are less likely to fail than other banks.  
Two studies have specifically examined the role that an audit plays in privately held 
banks. Lo (2015) finds that audits allow small banks, which are more opaque than other banks 
(Kashyap and Stein 2000), to better attract loanable funds in the form of large uninsured 
deposits. Using a sample of small private banks with assets under $500 million, he finds that 
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banks that receive an audit have access to more uninsured financing (large certificate of deposits) 
than banks that do not receive an audit. The audit reduces uncertainty about a bank’s financial 
position and this increase in “reporting credibility” allows banks to restrict lending less during 
liquidity shortages caused by changes in monetary policy (Lo 2015).  
Using a sample of privately held banks both above and below the asset threshold for a 
required audit, Barton et al. (2015) find that banks that receive either voluntary or mandatory 
audits pose less default risk to investors. The authors theorize that financial statement audits 
lower operational risk and reduce agency costs and that banks which either choose or are 
required to have an audit are therefore at a lower risk of failure than banks that do not have an 
audit performed. Taken together, these studies suggest that audits are beneficial for privately 
held banks. However, neither paper directly examines the relation between financial reporting 
quality and audits nor do they examine the other levels of assurance a private bank can select. I 
extend both the voluntary assurance literature and the banking literature by examining the factors 
that affect assurance levels selected by banks and the effect of assurance on bank financial 
reporting quality. 
C.  Background on the Banking Setting  
Due to the importance of the banking sector for the US economy, banks are subject to 
more regulatory scrutiny at the state and federal level than most other industries. There are 12 
Federal Reserve Districts within the Federal Reserve System, each of which is responsible for 
overseeing banks within their district. If a bank is not a member of the Federal Reserve, its 
national regulator is either the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) or the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), depending on whether the bank is state-chartered (FDIC) or 
nationally chartered (OCC). Most commercial banks have mandated on-site examinations by 
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federal regulators at least annually (Hirtle and Lopez 2002). Banks are also subject to regulation 
at the state level by either the attorney general’s office or another agency within the state 
government. State regulators also conduct on-site examinations. Though the duration between 
examinations varies depending on the state, most states mandate on-site examination at least 
every 18 months. During on-site examinations, regulators review financial and detailed loan 
records and conduct staff interviews. Regulators determine compliance with all relevant banking 
regulations and assess the bank’s risk using the CAMELS rating (further discussed below).  
In addition to frequent on-site examinations, banks are also required to submit call reports 
on a quarterly basis to regulators. Call reports provide a wealth of financial information which is 
not typically available for privately held companies. Along with unaudited GAAP financial 
statements, the call report includes a number of additional disclosures designed to aid regulators 
in monitoring the banks, including detailed financial and loan information. Publicly traded banks 
are required to have annual financial statement audits at the bank or holding company level, 
however privately held banks are required to have a financial statement audit only if their total 
assets exceed $500 million. For the subset of banks that I examine, assurance is generally 
voluntary and the level of assurance varies widely among banks. In addition, some banks change 
the level of assurance they purchase from year to year. All banks must disclose the level of 
assurance they purchased during the previous year in the March 30 call report. For example, the 
highest level of assurance received in 2016 would be reported in the March 30, 2017 call report. 
Banks must choose one of nine levels of assurance work performed in the previous year 
in the RCON6724 field of the call report. The instructions require banks to choose “the most 
comprehensive level of auditing work performed for the bank by independent external auditors 
12 
 
as of any date during” the previous year.5 “Auditing work” is a misnomer because only the first 
two levels of assurance are independent financial statement audits. (See Appendix A for detailed 
descriptions of each level as well as instructions to bank managers.) The instructions help 
managers determine the level of assurance purchased by the bank using excerpts from the 
different report types. The first level is an independent audit of the bank’s financial statements in 
accordance with GAAP by a certified public accounting firm. This level subjects the bank 
financial statements to the highest level of non-regulatory scrutiny. The second level is an 
independent audit of the bank holding company’s financial statements by a certified public 
accounting firm, which results in consolidated bank and bank holding company financial 
statements.  
The third level of assurance is an attestation on management’s assessment of the 
effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) by a certified public accounting 
firm. This attestation is the equivalent of Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 but 
since all of the banks in my sample are privately held, there is no internal control assessment 
requirement associated with their financial statement audit. In practice, very few banks select this 
as the highest level of assurance received (1.47 percent of the total sample). Banks that choose to 
have an attestation on management’s assessment of ICFR likely also choose to have an audit, if 
only for the efficiencies gained by performing both simultaneously.  
The fourth level of assurance is a “directors’ examination of the bank conducted in 
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards by a certified public accounting firm (may 
be required by state-chartering authority).” A directors’ examination is an agreed upon 
procedures engagement where the accounting firm performs a series of procedures that are 
                                                 
5 FDIC March 30, 2015 Report of Condition and Income, RCON 6724 Description. 
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designed and agreed on by the bank’s board of directors. Some states (e.g., Nebraska, Louisiana, 
etc.) have regulated minimum procedures that a directors’ examination must include, if the bank 
chooses to have a directors’ examination. Other states (e.g., Idaho and West Virginia) require a 
directors’ examination as the minimum level of assurance a bank can receive. Bank directors 
may also want the accounting firm to focus on the highest risk areas of the bank. This option is 
much less costly than a full audit, but it does not provide an opinion on the financial statements 
or any negative assurance. The fifth level of assurance is a directors’ examination performed by 
other external auditors (i.e. not an independent certified public accounting firm). The directions 
to the call report indicate that the bank should respond with a five if the directors’ examination is 
performed by “a consulting firm or another banking organization” rather than a certified public 
accounting firm.  
The sixth level of assurance described on the call report is a review of the bank’s 
financial statements by external auditors. A review generally consists of inquiries and analytical 
procedures. It provides limited, negative assurance that the accounting firm is not aware of any 
material modifications that must be made for the financial statements to be presented in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, but no opinion is expressed about the 
financial statements as a whole. The seventh level of assurance is a compilation of the bank’s 
financial statements by external auditors. A compilation does not provide any positive or 
negative assurance. The accounting firm assists bank management in producing the financial 
statements from the trial balance and ledgers. 
The eighth level of assurance is “other audit procedures (excluding tax preparation 
work).” This level may include agreed upon procedures engagements that do not meet the 
requirements for a directors’ examination in the state or other specific accounting or assurance 
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work performed by an external party. It does not include consulting or tax engagements. The 
ninth option is no external audit work. The bank would select this option if they did not engage a 
certified public accounting firm or other consulting firm to provide any of the previously 
discussed services during the year. 
As described above, state and federal regulators regularly examine banks and may 
strongly encourage or require them to be audited. Federal bank regulators classify banks using 
the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System (UFIRS), which is based on on-site 
examination results and a financial statement ratio analysis (FDIC 1997). This rating is 
commonly referred to as the CAMELS rating, an acronym for the six components of the UFIRS. 
Banks are rated from one (best) to five (worst) on their capital adequacy, assets, management 
capability, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market and interest rate risk. Banks are required 
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to hold a minimum amount of capital 
in reserve, based on the credit risk of the bank’s assets, as well as off-balance sheet derivatives 
and other exposures. The most commonly emphasized capital ratio is Tier 1 capital, or core 
capital, which must be at least four percent to avoid bank closure and at least eight percent to be 
considered well capitalized.6 
 Banks with CAMELS ratings of three, four, or five may be required to have an audit of 
their financial statements and those with an overall rating of four or five are in serious danger of 
bank failure. CAMELS ratings are not made publicly available, due to the obvious risk of 
creating a panic or bank run if a bank has a poor rating or downgrade in rating. Prior literature 
has found that ROA is the best proxy for the management capability component of the CAMELS 
rating (DeYoung 1998) and other financial ratios can substitute for the other components of the 
                                                 
6 https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/2000-4400.html 
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CAMELS rating, such as the Tier 1 capital ratio as a proxy for capital adequacy. In addition to 
the performance reasons that regulators may encourage an audit, de novo banks (those that have 
been registered with the FDIC for less than five years) are also strongly encouraged to purchase 
an audit of their financial statements.  
In discussions with financial executives at several privately held banks, assurance 
decisions are generally made by the board of directors in discussion with bank management. 
Cost is a primary consideration in the choice of assurance level. In addition to cost 
considerations, each person also emphasized the importance of complying with the requests and 
suggestions of both federal and state regulators.  
The choice of assurance level varies both between banks and within the bank over time. 
Some banks in my sample have the same level of assurance year after year, or continually 
increase their level of assurance. Other banks choose to have an audit every other year in order to 
save money and others cycle between other levels of assurance, such as a directors’ examination 
and a compilation. As discussed in the descriptive statistics in Section III, the proportion of 
banks in each assurance category does not change significantly over my sample period.  
D.  Hypotheses 
Collectively, prior work suggests that banks that purchase higher levels of assurance 
should have higher financial reporting quality. As discussed above, nonbank private companies 
that receive audits have outcomes that indicate higher financial reporting quality (i.e., lower 
interest rates)(Blackwell et al. 1998; Cassar and Minnis 2011; Lennox and Pittman 2011) and 
publicly traded banks that purchase higher quality audits have higher financial reporting quality 
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(Kanagaretnam et al. 2010).7 Because audits have frequently been associated with higher 
financial reporting quality, my first hypothesis, stated in the alternative, is as follows: 
H1: Financial reporting quality is higher for privately held banks that purchase an audit 
than for banks that purchase no assurance over the financial statements. 
While audits have previously been associated with higher financial reporting quality in 
the literature, bank directors’ examinations are a form of assurance that has not been previously 
examined. However, the purchase of an examination of the bank’s financial statements and 
underlying records by an independent third party likely results in better financial reporting 
quality for those banks than banks that have no independent third party examine their financial 
statements. Stated in the alternative, my second hypothesis is as follows: 
H2: Financial reporting quality is higher for privately held banks that purchase a bank 
directors’ examination than for banks that purchase no assurance over the financial 
statements. 
Reviews (negative assurance) have been found not to operate as a compensatory control 
for business owners in the same manner as audits (positive assurance) (Abdel-Khalik 1993). 
However, a review of the financial statements does require limited procedures to be performed 
by a third party accountant. I predict that banks that purchase reviews will have better financial 
reporting quality than banks that purchase no outside assurance at all. Specifically, my third 
hypothesis, stated in the alternative, is as follows: 
                                                 
7 However, financial institutions are often excluded from many financial accounting and auditing 
research studies due to their highly regulated environment. The frequent and detailed scrutiny 
provided by state and federal regulators discussed above may mean that a voluntary audit of the 
financial statements does not affect financial reporting quality because banks are prevented by 
regulators from manipulating their financial performance. 
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H3: Financial reporting quality is higher for privately held banks that purchase a review 
or compilation than for banks that purchase no assurance over the financial statements. 
III.  Determinants of Assurance Levels 
A.  Model Specification 
Because I am, to my knowledge, the first to examine the varying levels of assurance that 
private banks can purchase, I begin by developing a model to predict the level of assurance 
chosen by a bank. I consider prior literature on the audit choice as well as general bank 
characteristics and the CAMELS rating system developed by regulators in developing my model. 
Because several of the assurance levels form natural groups, I partition the sample into four 
groups as follows for ease of interpretation8: 
Assurance Group Assurance Level Audit Indicator Name 
Audit 9 Bank Audit 
 8 Bank Holding Company Audit 
 
Directors’ Examination 7 Attestation on Internal Controls 
 6 Directors’ Examination by CPA 
 5 Directors’ Examination by Other 
 
Review & Compilation 4 Review 
 3 Compilation 
 
No Assurance 2 Other Audit Procedures 
 1 No Assurance 
 
I examine the determinants of banks’ choice of assurance levels using the following 
model: 
PR(Assur_Groupit>j) = β0 + β1 Size it-1+ β2 Ageit-1 + β3Loansit-1 + β4Depositsit-1+ β5Employeesit-1 
  + β6Leverageit-1 + β7 Assur_Lvlit-1 + β8 Tier1it-1 + β9 ΔTier1it-1  
                                                 
8 My results are not sensitive to the inclusion of the “Attestation on Internal Controls” group in 
the Audit Group or the Directors’ Examination group. Banks whose highest level of assurance is 
an attestation on the effectiveness of internal controls constitute approximately 1.5 percent of the 
total sample. 
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   + β10 NPLit-1 + β11LLPit-1 + β12 ChargeOffsit-1 + β13 ROAit-1 + β14Lossit-1  
  + β15LoantoDepit-1 + β16LoanDepIntRatioit-1 + β17HetLoansit-1 
  + β18LoanCit-1+ β19LoanRit-1+ β20LoanAit-1+ β21LoanIit-1  
  + β23ΔCash Flowsit-1 + β24ΔLoansit-1 + β25ΔDepositsit-1 + βjStateFE    
  + βkYearFE + βlFedDistrictFE + ηit      (1) 
where: 
Assur_Group = an ordinal variable ranging from zero (no assurance) 
to three (audit), representing the level of assurance 
group (no assurance, review or compilation, 
director's examination, or audit); 
 
Size = total assets (RCFD2170); 
 
Age = bank age, calculated as year of report date 
(RSSD9999) less year of date established 
(RSSD9950); 
 
Loans = total loans (RCFD1400) scaled by total assets 
(RCFD2170); 
 
Deposits = total deposits (RCFD2200) scaled by total assets 
(RCFD2170); 
 
Employees = full-time equivalent employees (RIAD4150) during 
year t-1; 
 
Leverage = equity (RCFD3210) scaled by total assets 
(RCFD2170); 
 
Assur_Lvl =  10 less the audit level (RCFD6724); 
 
Tier1 = tier 1 risk-based capital ratio (RCFD7206); 
ΔTier1 = change in Tier1 capital ratio; 
 
NPL = Nonperforming loans (nonaccrual loans and leases 
receivable (RCFD1403) + loans 90+ days past due 
(RCFD1407)) scaled by total assets (RCFD2170); 
 
LLP = Loan loss provision (RIAD4230) scaled by total 
loans (RCFD1400); 
 
ChargeOffs = charge offs on allowance for loan losses, scaled by 
total assets (RCFD2170); 
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ROA = Net income before income taxes and extraordinary 
items (RIAD4301) scaled by total assets 
(RCFD2170). 
 
Loss = an indicator variable set equal to one if the bank had 
a loss during year t-1; 
 
LoantoDep = loan to deposit ratio, calculated as total loans 
(RCFD1400) divided by total deposits (RCFD2200); 
 
LoanDepIntRatio = loan to deposit interest ratio, calculated as total loan 
interest income (RIAD4010) divided by total deposit 
interest expense (RIAD4170); 
 
HetLoans = Heterogeneous loans scaled by total loans. 
Commercial and industrial loans (RCFD1600) + 
lease financing receivables (RCFD2165) + loans 
secured by real estate (RCFD1410) + agricultural 
loans (RCFD1590) + loans to banks in foreign 
countries (RCFD1510) /total loans (RCFD1400). 
 
LoanC = commercial and industrial loans (RCFD1600) scaled 
by total loans (RCFD1400); 
 
LoanR = real estate loans (RCFD1410) scaled by total loans 
(RCFD1400); 
 
LoanA = agricultural loans (RCFD1590) scaled by total loans 
(RCFD1400); 
 
LoanI = loans to individuals scaled by total loans 
(RCFD1400); 
 
ΔCashFlows = change in earnings before taxes and provision scaled 
by beginning total assets; 
 
ΔLoans = change in loans scaled by beginning total assets; 
 
ΔDeposits = change in deposits; 
 
State FE = state indicator variables; 
 
Year FE = fiscal year indicator variables; 
 
Fed Reserve District FE = federal reserve district indicator variables; and 
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η = the error term. 
 
I estimate Equation (1) using a cross sectional partial proportional odds regression model 
(Williams 2006). 9 I use a partial proportional odds model rather than an ordered logistic 
regression model because it is likely that the parallel lines assumption inherent to the ordered 
logistic regression model is violated by some of my variables. The parallel lines assumption 
forces all coefficients to take the same value for all values of assurance group (j=1, 2, 3). In 
untabulated tests, the parallel lines assumption is violated for 13 of the variables assuming a 0.05 
level of significance. The partial proportional odds model allows for the relaxation of the parallel 
lines assumption only for the variables for which the assumption is violated, while keeping it in 
place for variables that do not violate the assumption. The model is “equivalent to a series of 
logistic regressions where the categories of the dependent variable are combined” (Williams 
2006). In the first regression, Assur_Group= 0 (no assurance) is compared to the 
Assur_Group=1 (review or compilation), 2 (director’s examination), and 3 (audit) categories. In 
the second regression, the no assurance group and the review and compilation group are set to 
zero while the director’s examination group and audit group are set to one. In the third 
regression, all assurance groups below audit are set to zero and audit is set to one. I use robust 
standard errors clustered by bank to control for multiple appearances of the same banks within 
my sample (Petersen 2009). All independent variables in the model are measured at time t-1.  
General Bank Characteristic Proxies 
                                                 
9 Some prior literature has found that including fixed effects in nonlinear models can bias 
coefficient estimates due to the incidental parameters problem (Neyman and Scott 1948; 
Lancaster 2000). In untabulated tests, I also estimate Equation (1) using ordinary least squares. 
All inferences are unchanged. 
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I include in my model general bank characteristics that are likely to be associated with 
level of assurance. Based upon prior research, I expect larger, older (Size, Employees, Loans, 
Deposits, Age) banks to be associated with higher levels of assurance because they are more 
complex and may be more willing to purchase a higher level of assurance (Chow 1982; Abdel-
Khalik 1993; Carey et al. 2000; Hay and Davis 2004). I expect banks with more leverage 
(Leverage) to purchase higher levels of assurance because debt holders may require an audit or 
other minimum level of assurance (Chow 1982; Cassar and Minnis 2011). I expect the prior year 
level of assurance (Assur_lvl) to be positively associated with the current year level of assurance. 
CAMELS Proxies 
I also include proxies for the components of the CAMELS rating (capital adequacy, asset 
quality, management capability, earnings quality, liquidity, and sensitivity to risk) in the model 
in order to consider the role of regulators in the level of assurance purchased by a bank. By 
including several proxies for the components of the CAMELS rating, I capture indicators of risk 
and poor performance that would increase the likelihood of the bank being encouraged or 
required to purchase a higher level of assurance. To proxy for capital adequacy (C), I include 
Tier 1 Capital ratio (Tier1) as well as the change in the Tier 1 Capital ratio (ΔTier1). Banks with 
a higher Tier 1 Capital ratio have better risk management and would therefore be less likely to be 
required to have an audit (Ellul and Yerramilli 2013). I use nonperforming loans (NPL), loan loss 
provision (LLP), and charge offs (ChargeOffs) to proxy for asset quality (A). Banks with poor 
asset quality are more likely to fail (Jin et al. 2011; Barton et al. 2015). I therefore expect banks 
with poorer asset quality to purchase higher levels of assurance due to regulatory and debt holder 
pressure.  
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To proxy for management capability (M) and earnings (E), I use ROA (ROA) because it 
is the financial statement ratio most highly correlated with the confidential management ability 
score given to banks by regulators (DeYoung 1998). I also proxy for earnings using bank losses 
(Loss). Because banks which are in financial distress have been found to be more willing to have 
an audit, I expect banks with losses to have higher levels of assurance than other banks (Niemi et 
al. 2012). Banks are also subject to additional regulatory scrutiny if they have a loss and 
regulators may encourage the bank to purchase an audit. To proxy for liquidity (L), I use the loan 
to deposit ratio (LoantoDep) and the loan to deposit interest ratio (LoanDepIntRatio). I also 
include measures of a bank’s sensitivity to risk (S). If a bank is overly weighted in a specific loan 
type (i.e., real estate loans), that bank would be exposed to additional risk in the case of an 
economic downturn. I use heterogeneous loans (HetLoans), which are loans that are more 
difficult to value, commercial loans (LoanC), real estate loans (LoanR), agricultural loans 
(LoanA), and individual loans (LoanI), each as a percentage of total loans, to proxy for risk 
sensitivity (Liu and Ryan 2006). 
 
Additional Control Variables 
 I also include variables to proxy for growth (ΔCashFlows, ΔLoans, and ΔDeposits). I 
expect banks that are experiencing growth to purchase higher levels of assurance (Barton et al. 
2015). To control for state regulatory and economic differences, I include state fixed effects. I 
also include year fixed effects to control for the effect of time. I include Federal Reserve District 
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fixed effects in order to control for differing regulatory enforcement across Federal Reserve 
districts. (Barton et al. 2015).10 
B.  Sample 
I obtain quarterly Report of Condition and Income (call report) data from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago (2000 through 2010) and the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council (FFIEC) Central Data Repository’s Public Data Distribution website (2011 through 
2013). Because the audit indicator variable is reported only on an annual basis, I use annual data 
in my analyses. The audit indicator variable is reported in the call report starting with the March 
31, 1989 call report; however, in 1999 the FDIC added an “attestation on bank management’s 
assertion on the effectiveness of the bank’s internal control over financial reporting by a certified 
public accounting firm” level to the RCFD6734 audit indicator. My sample period for all tests 
begins in 2000 in order to keep the variable of interest consistent. The sample period ends in 
2012 because I need data for one future year for the assurance level variable. This is due to the 
assurance level variable for a given year being reported in the March call report of the following 
year.  
Table 1 contains the sample attrition information. I begin with 138,081 bank-year 
observations of commercial banks headquartered in the US. I eliminate all observations with 
more than $500 million in total assets, since these banks are required to have audits. This reduces 
my sample by 17,206 observations. Following other studies of private companies, I eliminate the 
very smallest banks, defined as those with less than $1 million in total assets and those missing 
                                                 
10 Of the 14 states that are in two Federal Reserve Districts, nine (Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Tennessee) have significantly 
different average assurance levels for bank-year observations in the same state but different 
Federal Reserve Districts.  
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loans and deposits (Hope et al. 2013). This reduces my sample by 13,505 observations. I 
eliminate banks missing the assurance level variable, reducing my sample by 13,713 
observations. Banks can be considered publicly traded for regulatory purposes if the bank itself 
is publicly traded or if it is part of a publicly traded multibank holding company (Holod and Peek 
2007; Lo 2015). In order to remove observations where a bank is publicly traded or part of a 
publicly traded multibank holding company, I perform several steps. I begin by eliminating 
observations which indicate that the bank is registered with the SEC or subject to Section 404 of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) on the call report SEC Reporting Status field 
(RSSD9056). However, this field only captures the bank’s SEC reporting status, not that of the 
bank holding company. If the bank holding company is publicly traded, the bank is required to 
have an audit at the consolidated holding company level as a minimum for compliance with SEC 
requirements. Banks must report on the call report the unique identifier (RSSD ID) of the parent 
holding company (regulatory high holder) in the Regulatory High Holder ID field (RSSD9348). 
Banks that do not have a holding company or which are in a one bank holding company use the 
bank’s RSSD ID in this field. To capture bank holding company reporting status, I compare the 
Regulatory High Holder ID field to the bank RSSD ID field to identify banks that are part of a 
multibank holding company. For those banks which are in a holding company (i.e., those whose 
SEC reporting status would not be captured by the SEC Reporting Status indicator variable used 
above), I match observations to CRSP using the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s CRSP-
FRB link file. I then delete all observations with price data in CRSP. This reduces my sample by 
1,797 observations. Observations missing necessary variables are also deleted, resulting in a 
sample reduction of 10,502 observations. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
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My sample contains 81,358 bank-year observations, consisting of 8,878 unique banks. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the one and 99 percent level to mitigate the effect of 
outliers. Since I am interested in the bank characteristics associated with the choice of assurance 
level, all banks in states where more than 95 percent of the sample population purchased an audit 
are eliminated from all determinants tests.11 These states may have laws that mandate audits at a 
much lower threshold than the federal level of $500 million or may have state regulators who 
systematically differ from those in other states. For example, Alabama requires an audit for all 
banks with more than $50 million in total assets.12 While I control for this variation using state-
level fixed effects, banks in these states do not appear to have a choice of their level of 
assurance. This further reduces my sample for the determinants test by 12,531 observations, to 
68,827 observations.  
C.  Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Because this is the first study of the varying levels of assurance banks in the United States 
purchase, I include detailed descriptive statistics. Table 2 contains detailed information about the 
sample composition. Panel A of Table 2 shows the sample by year and assurance level. The 
number of banks in the sample decreases monotonically over time, which is in line with the 
decrease in banks in the U.S. over the same period due to mergers and bank failures (Mccord et 
al. 2015). The first year in my sample, 2000, represents 9.3 percent of the sample, while the last 
year, 2012, represents 6.2 percent of the sample. While the number of banks per year decreases 
through the sample period, the proportion of banks in each assurance level remains relatively 
                                                 
11 Similar inferences are obtained if this threshold changes to 90 or 100 percent of banks in a 
state receiving an audit. 
12 The Code of Alabama, 1975, Section 5-2A-22. 
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constant. The largest proportion of the sample, 40 percent, purchases an audit at the bank level, 
while only 0.50 percent of bank-year observations are compilations. Panel B of Table 2 gives the 
Assurance Group by year and in total.  
Panel C of Table 2 details the observations by state because state laws and regulators may 
have an effect on the level of assurance a bank purchases. There is a large variation within the 
sample. For example, 49 percent of North Dakota observations indicate that the bank purchased 
no assurance, but 11 states have no bank-year observations that purchase no assurance. In 
Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, and Rhode Island, 100 percent of bank-year observations purchase an 
audit at the bank or holding company level. Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of the 
mean assurance level by state. Darker shades indicate higher levels of assurance. In general, 
banks in the Midwestern portion of the United States have lower levels of assurance than banks 
on the West Coast or East Coast.  
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
Panel D of Table 2 gives the observations by Federal Reserve District and Assurance Group. A 
bank’s federal regulator varies based on the Federal Reserve District, so this will likely have an 
effect on the bank’s purchased level of assurance. There is wide variation in the level of 
assurance by Federal District. Only 0.17 percent of bank-year observations within the Boston 
Federal Reserve District have no assurance, while 17.11 percent of those in the Minneapolis 
Federal Reserve District purchase no assurance. Figure 2 presents the mean assurance group by 
Federal Reserve District. Because 19 states are in more than one Federal Reserve District, it is 
important to consider potentially different Federal enforcement levels in my analysis. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 [Insert Figure 2 Here] 
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Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample. 61.1 percent of observations have 
an audit at the bank or bank holding company level, 31.7 percent have a directors’ examination 
or internal control assessment, 1.3 percent have a review or compilation, and 5.8 percent 
purchase no assurance services. Due to the nature of the sample restrictions, the average bank-
year observation in my sample is small, with $133 million in assets. Approximately 11 percent of 
observations in my sample have a loss.  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
Table 4 presents comparative descriptive statistics for the different assurance groups. In 
general, I find that the groups differ on nearly every dimension. Panel A compares banks that 
purchase a director’s examination to banks that purchase an audit. Compared to banks that 
purchase a directors’ examination, banks that purchase an audit are larger (Size), less profitable 
(ROA), and newer (Age). They have more real estate loans as a proportion of total loans (LoanR) 
and a smaller proportion of agricultural (LoanA) and individual loans (LoanI). Banks with audits 
are also less likely to just meet or beat prior year earnings (JMBE) and more likely to just avoid 
losses (Loss_Avoid).  
Panel B compares banks that purchase a compilation or review to banks that purchase a 
director’s examination. Compared to bank-year observations that purchase a compilation or 
review, banks with a directors’ examination are smaller, more profitable, and older. They have 
fewer real estate loans and more agricultural and individual loans. There is no significant 
difference in their likelihood of just meeting or beating prior year earnings or just avoiding a 
loss. Panel C compares banks that purchase no assurance to banks that purchase compilations or 
reviews. Compared to banks with no assurance, banks that purchase a compilation or review are 
larger, less profitable, and newer. They have more real estate loans and fewer agricultural and 
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individual loans. Again, there is no significant difference in just meeting or beating prior year 
earnings or just avoiding a loss. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
Multivariate Results 
The determinants of banks’ levels of assurance are presented in Table 5. All independent 
variables in the model are measured at time t-1. The three columns of Table 5 present the results 
of the three comparison groups discussed in the model section. Column 1 presents the results for 
banks that purchase a review, director’s examination, or audit compared to banks that purchase 
no assurance. In column 2, I present the results of the regression comparing banks that purchase 
directors’ examinations and audits to those that have no assurance, or reviews and compilations. 
In column 3, I present the results of the regression comparing banks that purchase audits to those 
that have no assurance, reviews or compilations, and directors’ examinations. Most inferences 
remain consistent across comparison groups. The Assur_Group coefficient is positive and 
significant (p<0.001), indicating that the assurance level choice is somewhat sticky. In general, 
there appear to be two different types of banks that purchase more assurance. On one hand, the 
bank may be well-managed and seek the additional credit and freedom from regulation that an 
audit can provide (Kanagaretnam et al. 2003; Lo 2015).  This is supported by larger banks (Size) 
with more deposits (Deposits), improving Tier 1 capital ratios (ΔTier1), and better asset quality 
(NPL and Charge-Offs) purchasing more assurance. Banks that are experiencing growth in loans 
(ΔLoans) and deposits (ΔDeposits) are also more likely to purchase a higher level of assurance. 
These results suggest larger, growing banks purchase higher levels of assurance than other 
banks. 
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On the other hand, a bank may be pressured into purchasing a higher level of assurance 
by federal and state regulators due to its poor performance or higher risk profile. Banks with 
lower returns on assets (ROA) are more likely to purchase more assurance, as are banks with a 
higher loan to deposit ratio (LoantoDep), suggesting that banks that are less liquid and take on 
more risk purchase higher levels of assurance. The coefficient on total loans as a percentage of 
total assets (Loans) is negative and significant (p<0.001), suggesting that banks that are more 
complex and therefore have a lower ratio of loans to total assets are more likely to purchase a 
higher level of assurance. As seen in column 3, banks that purchase audits specifically are likely 
to be younger (Age), have more leverage (Leverage), and are more likely to have losses (Loss). 
Taken together, these results suggest that regulators may influence the decision of riskier, more 
poorly performing banks to purchase an audit rather than a lower level of assurance. 
 [Insert Table 5 Here] 
IV.  Implications of Assurance Level 
A.  Discretionary Loan Loss Provision Model 
To test whether a bank’s chosen level of assurance affects its financial statement quality, 
I begin by examining the relation between the level of assurance purchased by a bank and 
discretionary loan loss provisions. The loan loss provision is generally the largest and most 
complex accrual for banks. It is also subject to a great deal of judgment and discretion on the part 
of management. Many studies have found evidence of banks using the loan loss provision to 
manage earnings (Beatty et al. 1995; Beatty and Harris 1998; Beatty et al. 2002; Kanagaretnam 
et al. 2003; Cornett et al. 2009; Kanagaretnam et al. 2010). However, others (Ahmed et al. 1999) 
find no evidence of earnings management using the loan loss provision and instead find that the 
loan loss provision is used to manage regulatory capital levels and ratios. I first estimate the 
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following model of discretionary loan loss provisions using an ordinary least squares regression 
model, following Kanagaretnam et al. (2003): 
LLPit=γ0 + γ1Tier1it-1+γ2TCAPit-1+γ3ΔLOANit+γ4LLAit-1 + γ5EBTPSit + γ6NPLit + γ7ΔNPLit  
+ γ8ChargeOffsit + βjYearFE +ϵit        (2) 
where: 
 LLP  = the loan loss provision scaled by total loans; 
TCAP  = the Total Risk Adjusted capital ratio at year t-1; 
LLA = the allowance for loan and lease losses (RCFD3123) scaled by total 
assets (RCFD2170); 
 
EBTPS = earnings before taxes, loan loss provision, and special items in year t                
scaled by total assets; 
 
ΔNPL = the change in nonperforming loans from year t-1 to t, scaled by total 
assets; 
 
YearFE = fiscal year indicator variables; 
ϵ  = the error term. 
All other variables are previously defined. The residual from this model, ϵ, represents the 
component of the loan loss provision that is unexplained by loan activity. It captures 
management’s discretion in the estimate of the loan loss provision or DLLP. Using this residual 
as the dependent variable, I next estimate the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
model: 
 
 
DLLPit = β0 + β1Auditit + β2IC_Examit + β3Review_Compit + β4Sizeit+ β5Leverageit  
+ β6Assur_Lvlit-1 + β7ΔAssur_Lvlit+ β8 Tier1it+ β9 ΔTier 1it + β10NPLit + β11 LLPit    
+ β12ROAit + β13 HetLoans it+ β14LoanCit + β15ΔCashFlowsit + β16ΔLoansit+ β17ΔDepositsit 
+ βjStateFE + βkYearFE + βlFedDistrictFE + ηit          (3) 
 
where: 
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DLLP = the discretionary portion of the loan loss provision, measured as the 
residual from Equation (2); 
 
Audit = an indicator variable set equal to one if the bank purchased an audit at 
the bank or holding company level in the current year (RCFD6724), zero 
otherwise; 
 
IC_Exam = An indicator variable set equal to one if the bank purchased an 
attestation on the effectiveness of internal controls or a directors' 
examination in the current year (RCFD6724), zero otherwise; 
 
Review_Comp = an indicator variable set equal to one if the bank purchased a review or 
compilation in the current year (RCFD6724), zero otherwise. 
 
 All other variables are previously defined. The coefficients of interest are β1, β2, and β3, 
which represent how the level of assurance is associated with the discretionary loan loss 
provision. Negative and significant values for these coefficients would suggest that purchasing 
assurance is negatively associated with the degree to which bank managers manipulate the loan 
loss provision relative to banks that receive no assurance. 
I include control variables that prior literature has found to be associated with DLLP 
(DeBoskey and Jiang 2012). I control for the size of the bank (Size), the degree to which the 
bank is leveraged (Leverage), the prior year assurance level (Lag_Assur_Lvl), and the change in 
assurance level from the prior year (ΔAssur_Lvl). I also control for capital adequacy (Tier1 and 
ΔTier1), the proportion of nonperforming loans (NPL), and the proportion of loan loss provision 
to total loans (LLP), all of which could incentivize bank management to use more discretion in 
the loan loss provision. I control for management ability (ROA) and the percentage of 
commercial and heterogeneous loans, which require additional management judgment to 
determine the appropriate reserve (LoanC and HetLoans)(Liu and Ryan 2006). Finally, I control 
for growth using changes in cash flows, loans, and deposits. Following Beatty et al. (2002), I 
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control for regional effects with Federal Reserve District indicator variables. I also include state 
and year fixed effects. 
B.  Just Meet or Beat Prior Year Earnings Model 
 I next use the propensity to just meet or beat prior year earnings as a proxy for financial 
reporting quality. While privately held banks do not have a large number of shareholders who are 
restricted to the use of earnings based performance measures, they are still incentivized to meet 
or beat prior year earnings (Beatty et al. 2002). Regulators are concerned with the earnings 
quality of the bank and bank customers and large creditors are sensitive to the health of their 
bank and may choose to move their deposits elsewhere if they perceive the possibility of a bank 
failure, which can in turn lead to a run on the bank (Diamond and Dybvig 1983).  This is 
particularly true for large uninsured depositors (Lo 2015). In order to test whether banks just 
meet or beat prior year earnings using discretion, I first adapt a measure used by Davis et al. 
(2009) in a non-banking paper. In a paper examining the relation between auditor tenure and the 
ability to meet or beat analyst forecasts, the authors construct a measure of pre-managed earnings 
per share (EPS) by subtracting discretionary accruals per share from reported EPS. The authors 
use this measure to estimate the difference between analysts’ estimated earnings and the earnings 
that would be reported if no discretionary accruals were used by management. I adapt this 
measure for privately held banks using ROA and the discretionary loan loss provision scaled by 
assets. I begin by calculating nondiscretionary ROA (NROA), which is defined as:  
NROA = Actual ROA – (DLLP/Assets) 
 NROA represents the portion of ROA that is not subject to management’s discretion over 
the DLLP. I exclude from the sample all bank-year observations with a change in 
nondiscretionary ROA (ΔNROA) greater than or equal to zero. Since this is the change in 
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earnings that would result if no discretionary loan loss provision were used, these banks would 
have no incentive to manage earnings further to narrowly meet or beat prior year earnings 
because that benchmark has already been achieved (Davis et al. 2009). Following Kanagaretnam 
et al. (2010), I define just meeting or beating prior year earnings as an increase in ROA between 
zero and 0.0005. I next identify banks whose ΔNROA is negative, but who just meet or beat prior 
year earnings using actual ΔROA (i.e. those banks that have likely manipulated current year 
earnings in order to beat prior year). For these banks, JMBE is set equal to one. I then estimate 
the following logistic regression model: 
PR(JMBEit) = β0 + β1Auditit + β2IC_Examit + β3Review_Compit + β4Sizeit+ β5Leverageit  
         + β6Assur_Lvlit-1 + β7ΔAssur_Lvlit+ β8 Tier1it+ β9 ΔTier 1it + β10NPLit + β11 LLPit    
         + β12ROAit + β13 HetLoans it+ β14LoanCit + β15ΔCashFlowsit + β16ΔLoansit  
         + β17ΔDepositsit + βjStateFE + βkYearFE + βlFedDistFE + ηit (4) 
 where: 
JMBE = An indicator variable set equal to one if ΔROA is between zero and 0.0005, and   
ΔNROA is less than zero, zero otherwise. 
 
All other variables are previously defined. The coefficients of interest are β1, β2, and β3, 
which represent how the level of assurance affects the propensity of banks to just meet or beat 
prior year earnings. Negative and significant values for these coefficients would suggest that 
purchasing assurance is negatively associated with the degree to which bank managers use 
discretion to just meet or beat prior year earnings relative to banks that receive no assurance. I 
include control variables previously found in the literature to be associated with earnings 
management in banks (Kanagaretnam et al. 2010; DeBoskey and Jiang 2012). I control for the 
size of the bank (Size), the degree to which the bank is leveraged (Leverage), the prior year 
assurance level (Lag_Assur_Lvl), and the change in assurance level from the prior year 
(ΔAssur_Lvl). I also control for capital adequacy (Tier1 and ΔTier1), the proportion of 
nonperforming loans (NPL), and the proportion of loan loss provision to total loans (LLP), all of 
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which could incentivize bank management to use more discretion in the loan loss provision. I 
control for management ability (ROA) and the percentage of commercial and heterogeneous 
loans, which require additional management judgment to determine the appropriate reserve 
(LoanC and HetLoans)(Liu and Ryan 2006). Finally, I control for changes in cash flows, loans, 
and deposits. 
C.  Loss Avoidance Model 
I next examine the relation between assurance and the propensity to just avoid a loss 
using discretion. I eliminate all bank-year observations with NROA greater than zero since these 
banks have avoided a loss without the use of discretion and therefore have no need to manage 
earnings within the narrowly defined loss avoidance interval. Following Kanagaretnam et al. 
(2010), I define just avoiding a loss as a ROA between zero and 0.002. I then identify bank-year 
observations that have a negative NROA, but just avoid a loss using unadjusted ROA. I set 
Loss_Avoid equal to one for these observations, which have avoided a loss using discretion. I 
estimate the following logistic regression model: 
PR(Loss_Avoidit) = β0 + β1Auditit + β2IC_Examit + β3Review_Compit + β4Sizeit+ β5Leverageit  
              + β6Assur_Lvlit-1 + β7ΔAssur_Lvlit+ β8 Tier1it+ β9 ΔTier 1it + β10NPLit  
     + β11 LLPit + β12ROAit + β13 HetLoans it+ β14LoanCit + β15ΔCashFlowsit  
     + β16ΔLoansit + β17ΔDepositsit + βjStateFE + βkYearFE 
     + βlFedDistFE + ηit        (5) 
 where: 
Loss_Avoid = An indicator variable set equal to one if ROA is between aero and 0.002 
and NROA is less than zero, zero otherwise. 
 
All other variables are previously defined. The coefficients of interest are β1, β2, and β3, 
which represent how the level of assurance affects the propensity of banks to just avoid a loss. 
Negative and significant values for these coefficients would suggest that purchasing assurance 
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decreases the degree to which bank managers use discretion to just avoid a loss relative to banks 
that receive no assurance. 
I control for the size of the bank (Size), the degree to which the bank is leveraged 
(Leverage), the prior year assurance level (Lag_Assur_Lvl), and the change in assurance level 
from the prior year (ΔAssur_Lvl). I also control for capital adequacy (Tier1 and ΔTier1), the 
proportion of nonperforming loans (NPL), and the proportion of loan loss provision to total loans 
(LLP), all of which could incentivize bank management to use more discretion in the loan loss 
provision. I control for management ability (ROA) and the percentage of commercial and 
heterogeneous loans, which require additional management judgment to determine the 
appropriate reserve (LoanC and HetLoans) (Liu and Ryan 2006). Finally, I control for changes in 
cash flows, loans, and deposits. 
D.  Sample 
The elimination of all observations where the bank met or exceeded prior year earnings 
without the use of discretion reduces my sample for the JMBE test from 81,358 observations to 
36,644 observations. For the loss avoidance test, I eliminate all observations that have NROA 
greater than zero, to eliminate firms that did not have a loss using the NROA calculation. This 
reduces my sample for that test to 10,941 observations.  
E.  Financial Reporting Quality Results 
 Table 6 presents tests of the relation between banks’ level of assurance and financial 
reporting quality. If higher levels of assurance improve banks’ financial reporting quality, I 
would expect that the level of discretionary loan loss provision (DLLP), the probability of just 
meeting or beating prior year earnings (JMBE), and the probability of just avoiding a loss 
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(Loss_Avoid) will be lower for banks that purchase higher levels of assurance. I also expect that 
audits would be significantly better than directors’ examinations, reviews, or compilations. 
Column (1) presents the results using DLLP as a proxy for financial reporting quality. For 
ease of interpretation, I multiply all coefficients in the model by 100. The coefficient on Audit is 
negative and significant (p < 0.01), suggesting that banks that purchase audits have lower levels 
of discretionary loan loss provisions on average than banks that purchase no assurance. The 
coefficients on IC_Exam and Review_Comp are also negative and significant (p < 0.01 and 
p=0.034, respectively), indicating that all forms of assurance are associated with lower levels of 
DLLP in banks. F-tests show that the coefficients on each of my three variables of interest are 
significantly different from each other. Audits are significantly better at constraining DLLP than 
either directors’ examinations or reviews and compilations, and directors’ examinations are 
significantly better than reviews and compilations. 
Column (2) presents the results using just meeting or beating prior year earnings (JMBE) 
as a proxy for financial reporting quality. The area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic 
(ROC) curve is 0.836, indicating a good model fit (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). I find that the 
coefficient on Audit is negative and significant (p = 0.032), indicating that audited banks are less 
likely than banks that purchase no assurance to just meet or beat prior year earnings using 
discretion. The coefficient on IC_Exam is also negative and significant (p = 0.028), however the 
coefficient on Review_Comp is positive and insignificant. F-tests show that the coefficients on 
each of my three variables of interest are significantly different from each other. Banks with 
audits are significantly less likely to just meet or beat prior year earnings using discretion than 
banks with either directors’ examinations or reviews and compilations, and banks with directors’ 
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examinations are also significantly less likely to just meet or beat prior year earnings than those 
that purchase reviews and compilations. 
In column (3) of Table 6, I examine the relation between assurance level and just 
avoiding a loss (Loss_Avoid). The area under the ROC curve is 0.726, indicating a fair model fit 
(Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). I find that the coefficient on Audit is negative and marginally 
significant (p = 0.077), while the coefficients on IC_Exam and Review_Comp are both negative 
and insignificant. This result suggests that audited banks are less likely to use to discretion to just 
avoid a loss (Loss_Avoid), however, banks that purchase lower levels of assurance are not 
statistically less likely to just avoid a loss than banks that purchase no assurance services at all. 
F-tests indicate that while the coefficient on Audit is significantly different from IC_Exam and 
Review_Comp, the coefficients on IC_Exam and Review_Comp do not differ from each other. 
Taken together, my results suggest that higher levels of assurance are associated with better 
financial reporting quality, and that banks that purchase audits have significantly better financial 
reporting quality and less earnings management than those that purchase directors’ examinations 
and other non-audit assurance.  
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
V.  Robustness Tests  
A. Exclusion of Multibank Bank Holding Companies 
 Most banks in the United States are controlled by bank holding companies. Bank holding 
companies can control one or many banks in addition to other nonbank subsidiary companies. In 
order to determine whether bank assurance decisions are made at the bank level or the bank 
holding company level, I analyze the assurance level of banks that are part of a multibank 
holding company on an annual basis in Table 7. Approximately 84 percent of my sample is 
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comprised of single banks, while the remaining 16 percent is made up of banks that are part of a 
multibank bank holding company. Of that 16 percent, approximately 22 percent have different 
assurance levels in the same year within the same bank holding company. Therefore, assurance 
decisions appear to be made to some extent at the bank level.  
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
 In my main determinants test, I include all banks regardless of the number of banks in the 
same bank holding company. In robustness tests, I also run my determinants tests after excluding 
all banks that are part of multibank bank holding companies. This reduces my sample by 12,025 
bank-year observations, to 56,748. The results are presented in Table 8. All results remain 
consistent with respect to direction and significance with the exception of the coefficient on 
ΔDeposits, which loses significance in the robustness model except in the model comparing 
banks that purchase audits with those that purchase all other levels of assurance, where it remains 
positive and significant (p=0.000). 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
B.  Just Meet or Beat and Loss Avoidance Threshold Sensitivity 
In my main tests, I use thresholds for just meeting or beating prior year earnings and loss 
avoidance from Kanagaretnam et al. (2010). In robustness tests, I follow Degeorge et al. (1999) 
and Beatty et al. (2002) and construct histograms of return on assets (ROA) and the change in 
return on assets (ΔROA). Following their methodology, I use bin widths of twice the interquartile 
range of the variables, multiplied by the negative cube root of the sample size. Using this 
formula, the bin width for ROA is 0.0025 and the bin width for ΔROA is 0.0016. I use these bin 
widths to construct thresholds for ROA and ΔROA that would be considered small (i.e. just 
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avoiding a loss and just meeting or beating prior year earnings, respectively). In Table 9, I 
examine whether the relation between JMBE and my measures of assurance group varies based 
on the threshold used to define JMBE. All inferences remain the same as in Table 6 when I use a 
threshold of one, two, or three bin widths. This suggests that banks that purchase higher levels of 
assurance are less likely to just meet or beat earnings using discretion. 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
 In Table 10, I examine whether the relation between Loss_Avoid and my measures of 
assurance group varies based on the threshold used to define Loss_Avoid. All inferences remain 
the same as in Table 6 when I use a threshold of two or three bin widths. However, the 
coefficient on Audit is insignificant when the Loss_Avoid threshold is defined as one bin width. 
Taken together, these results suggest that banks that purchase higher levels of assurance are less 
likely to manage earnings to meet benchmarks than banks that do not purchase assurance. 
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
C. Excluding Banks with Large Losses and Large Negative Changes in Earnings  
 In the main tests of the relation between bank assurance level and financial reporting 
quality, I include all banks with ΔNROA less than zero for the just meet or beat prior year 
earnings test. However, some banks have large negative changes in earnings such that even if 
they eliminated the entire allowance for loan and lease losses (the contra-asset account), they 
would be unable to beat prior year earnings. I adapt a measure from a non-banking paper in order 
to test the sensitivity of my results to the elimination of banks that would not be able to achieve 
the respective earnings benchmarks. Cassell et al. (2015) examine the relation between 
disclosure transparency in the valuation allowance accounts and earnings management. They 
limit their sample to “companies where the beginning balance of the allowance account is at least 
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one cent per share” (Cassell et al. 2015). Because earnings per share is not an important measure 
for privately held banks, I adapt the measure as follows. As a robustness test, I remove all 
observations from the sample where: 
ΔNROA + LLA ≤ 0 
where: 
 LLA = the allowance for loan and lease losses scaled by total assets. 
 This eliminates banks that could not use discretion to just meet or beat prior year 
earnings. Table 11 presents the results of the logistic regression. The coefficients on Audit and 
IC_Exam both remain negative and significant, however; the coefficient on Review_Comp, while 
still negative, is no longer significant. 
[Insert Table 11 Here] 
 In the main tests of the relation between bank assurance level and financial reporting 
quality, I include all banks with NROA less than zero for the loss avoidance test. However, some 
banks have large losses such that even if they eliminated the entire allowance for loan and lease 
losses (the contra-asset account), they would be unable to avoid a loss. I again adapt the sample 
restriction in Cassell et al. (2015) to the banking setting. As a robustness test, I remove all 
observations from the sample where: 
NROA + LLA ≤ 0 
 This eliminates banks that could not use discretion to just avoid a loss. Table 12 presents 
the results of the logistic regression. The coefficients on Audit and IC_Exam are negative and 
significant, however; the coefficient on Review_Comp, while negative, is not significant. 
[Insert Table 12 Here] 
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D. Financial Reporting Quality Model Specification Robustness Test 
 In my main financial reporting quality tests, I control for both the change in assurance 
level and the prior year assurance level. In order to rule out potential confounding effects of 
those variables, I eliminate them from the models as a robustness test. Table 13 presents the 
results of the ordinary least squares and logistic regressions. My inferences for the variables of 
interest remain unchanged. My results do not appear to be sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion 
of the change in assurance level and prior year assurance level variables. 
[Insert Table 13 Here] 
VI.  Conclusion 
 In this paper, I investigate a unique disclosure in commercial bank call reports, the level 
of assurance obtained by a bank. Using a partial proportional odds model, I first examine 
determinants of the assurance purchased by a bank. I find that two types of banks are associated 
with higher levels of assurance. Banks that are well-managed and seeking additional credit have 
higher levels of assurance. These include larger banks with better asset quality and those 
experiencing growth. On the other hand, banks with poor financial performance and higher 
leverage in the previous year are associated with higher levels of assurance. These results 
suggest that regulatory pressure because of poor financial performance is one reason why small 
privately held banks have a financial statement audit. 
 I then examine the financial reporting quality consequences of banks’ levels of assurance. 
I find that audits, bank directors’ examinations, and reviews and compilations are associated with 
lower levels of discretionary loan loss provisions, suggesting that banks that purchase higher 
levels of assurance manage earnings less than banks with no assurance services. I find that banks 
that purchase audits and bank directors’ examinations are less likely to just meet or beat prior 
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year earnings using discretion. I find weak evidence that banks with audits are less likely to use 
discretionary loan loss provisions to avoid a loss. In sum, higher levels of assurance are 
associated with better financial reporting quality and decreased earnings management in 
privately held U.S. commercial banks. 
This is the first study to examine levels of assurance in the financial industry, and 
benefits from a large, detailed data set of financial information for privately held banks. These 
results should be of interest to regulators, bank stakeholders, and researchers interested in 
privately held companies and financial institutions. Further research might investigate other 
consequences of the level of assurance a bank purchases and examine the link between 
regulation and assurance. 
This study has several limitations. First, since I focus on only one highly regulated 
industry, the results may not generalize to other private companies. The highly regulated nature 
of the banking industry should bias me against finding results, however, since external audit 
should not matter as much as it does in other, less regulated industries. Both federal and state 
regulators frequently examine commercial banks and bank managers would generally defer more 
to a regulator’s opinion than the advice of an auditor regarding accounting matters. Second, I 
cannot determine whether the financial reporting quality results are due to the increased level of 
assurance itself or due to the types of managers who are more likely to purchase higher levels of 
assurance also being more likely to have better financial reporting quality. Finally, the auditor or 
other assurance provider’s firm name is not available in the call report data. Therefore, I cannot 
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control for auditor quality variables such as Big N or industry specialization. Audit or assurance 
fees are also generally not disclosed in the call report.17  
  
 
  
                                                 
17 Audit fees are only required to be disclosed if they are one of the top three non-interest 
expenses for the bank. 
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APPENDIX A - Call Report Audit Indicator Disclosure, Continued  
50 
 
APPENDIX A - Call Report Audit Indicator Disclosure, Continued 
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APPENDIX B - Variable Definitions 
  
Dependent Variables 
Variable Name Definition 
Assur_Group An ordinal variable ranging from zero (no assurance) to three 
(audit), representing the level of assurance group (no assurance, 
review or compilation, director's examination, or audit). 
 
DLLP The residual from the following regression: 
LLPit=γ0 + γ1Tier1it-1+γ2TCAPit-1+γ3ΔLOANit+γ4LLAit-1 + γ5EBTPSit 
+ γ6NPLit + γ7ΔNPLit + γ8ChargeOffsit + βjYearFE +ϵit   
 
JMBE An indicator variable set equal to one if ΔROA is between zero and 
0.0005, zero otherwise. 
 
Loss_Avoid An indicator variable set equal to one if ROA is between 0 and 
0.002, zero otherwise. 
  
Variables of Interest 
Audit An indicator variable set equal to one if the bank received an audit 
at the bank or holding company level in the current year 
(RCFD6724), zero otherwise. 
 
IC_Exam An indicator variable set equal to one if the bank received an 
attestation on the effectiveness of internal controls or a directors' 
examination in the current year (RCFD6724), zero otherwise. 
 
Review_Comp An indicator variable set equal to one if the bank received a review 
or compilation in the current year (RCFD6724), zero otherwise. 
  
Control Variables 
  
General Bank Characteristics 
Size The natural logarithm of total assets (RCFD2170). 
 
Age The natural logarithm of bank age, calculated as year of report date 
(RSSD9999) less year of date established (RSSD9950) plus one. 
 
Loans Total loans (RCFD1400) scaled by total assets (RCFD2170). 
Deposits Total deposits (RCFD2200) scaled by total assets (RCFD2170). 
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Employees The natural logarithm of full-time equivalent employees 
(RIAD4150) during year t-1. 
 
Leverage Total equity (RCFD3210) divided by total assets (RCFD 
Assur_Lvl 10 less the audit level (RCFD6724). 
 
LLA Allowance for loan and lease losses (RCFD3123) scaled by total 
assets (RCFD2170). 
 
Capital Adequacy 
Tier1 Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio (RCFD7206). 
 
ΔTier1 Change in Tier1 capital ratio. 
 
Asset Quality 
NPL Nonperforming loans (nonaccrual loans and leases receivable 
(RCFD1403) + loans 90+ days past due (RCFD1407)) scaled by 
total assets (RCFD2170). 
 
LLP Loan loss provision (RIAD4230) scaled by total loans 
(RCFD1400). 
 
ChargeOffs Charge offs on allowance for loan losses, scaled by total assets 
(RCFD2170). 
 
Management Capability and Earnings 
ROA Net income before income taxes and extraordinary items 
(RIAD4301) scaled by total assets (RCFD2170). 
 
Loss An indicator variable set equal to one if the bank had a loss during 
year t-1 and zero otherwise. 
 
Liquidity 
LoantoDep Loan to deposit ratio, calculated as total loans (RCFD1400) divided 
by total deposits (RCFD2200). 
 
LoanDepIntRatio Loan to deposit interest ratio, calculated as total loan interest 
income (RIAD4010) divided by total deposit interest expense 
(RIAD4170). 
 
 
Sensitivity to Risk 
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HetLoans Heterogeneous loans scaled by total loans. Commercial and 
industrial loans (RCFD1600) + lease financing receivables 
(RCFD2165) + loans secured by real estate (RCFD1410) + 
agricultural loans (RCFD1590) + loans to banks in foreign 
countries (RCFD1510) /total loans (RCFD1400). 
 
LoanC Commercial and industrial loans (RCFD1600) scaled by total loans 
(RCFD1400). 
 
LoanR Real estate loans (RCFD1410) scaled by total loans (RCFD1400) 
LoanA Agricultural loans (RCFD1590) scaled by total loans (RCFD1400). 
LoanI Loans to individuals scaled by total loans (RCFD1400). 
 
Growth 
Δ CashFlows Change in net income before income taxes and extraordinary items 
(RIAD4301) less the loan loss provision (RIAD4230), scaled by 
total assets (RCFD2170). 
 
ΔROA Change in ROA. 
 
ΔLoans Change in loans. 
 
ΔDeposits Change in deposits. 
 
ΔHetLoans Change in heterogeneous loans. 
 
Fixed Effects 
State FE State indicator variables. 
 
Year FE Fiscal year indicator variables. 
 
Fed Reserve District FE Federal reserve district indicator variables. 
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TABLE 1 - Sample Selection 
  
  
Bank-Year 
Observations  
Total US bank-year call report observations 138,081   
 Less: observations with greater than $500 million in total assets (17,206)  
 Less: observations with less than $1 million in total assets    
      or less than $1 in loans or deposits (13,505)  
 Less: observations missing assurance level variable (13,713)  
 Less: publicly traded observations (1,797)  
 Less: observations missing necessary variables (10,502)  
Final Sample, Discretionary Loan Loss Provision Model 81,358  * 
    
Assurance Level Determinants Sample Selection   
Discretionary Loan Loss Provision sample from above 81,358   
 Less: observations in states with more than 95% audit (12,531)  
Final Sample, Assurance Level Determinants Model 68,827   
    
Just Meet or Beat Prior Year Earnings Sample Selection   
Discretionary Loan Loss Provision sample from above 81,358   
 Less: observations with ΔNROA > 0 (44,714)  
Final Sample, Just Meet or Beat Prior Year Earnings Model 36,644   
    
Loss Avoidance Sample Selection   
Discretionary Loan Loss Provision sample from above 81,358   
 Less: observations with NROA > 0 (70,417)  
Final Sample, Loss Avoidance Model 10,941   
    
    
    
*8,878 unique banks   
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TABLE 2 - Sample Summary 
Panel A: Assurance Level by Year 
           
                
     No Assurance    
 Compilation and 
Review    Director's Exam    Audit  
 Total  
No 
Assur. 
Other 
Audit 
Proc.  
Comp- 
ilation  Review   
Directors' 
Exam  
Directors' 
Exam by 
CPA 
Firm 
Attest. 
on IC   
BHC 
Audit 
Bank 
Audit  
Year  #  %  % %  % %  % % %  % % 
2000 7,571  9.31  3.16 1.85  0.41 0.61  4.39 24.49 2.54  21.58 40.99 
2001 7,390  9.08  3.04 1.88  0.37 0.60  5.05 23.95 1.83  21.71 41.58 
2002 7,184  8.83  3.15 2.07  0.33 0.64  5.01 23.94 1.63  22.12 41.11 
2003 7,004  8.61  3.06 2.33  0.34 0.80  5.33 23.74 1.41  23.20 39.79 
2004 6,794  8.35  2.91 2.49  0.38 0.78  5.45 24.14 1.46  23.43 38.96 
2005 6,189  7.61  3.10 2.75  0.42 0.69  6.27 25.64 1.50  19.39 40.23 
2006 6,028  7.41  3.57 2.75  0.48 0.93  5.99 25.03 1.19  20.19 39.86 
2007 5,929  7.29  3.39 2.82  0.46 1.05  5.89 24.59 1.25  20.24 40.33 
2008 5,820  7.15  3.11 3.44  0.57 1.01  5.69 24.83 1.22  20.41 39.73 
2009 5,674  6.97  2.96 3.33  0.60 1.30  5.60 25.59 1.15  20.00 39.46 
2010 5,456  6.71  3.10 3.08  0.48 1.12  5.68 25.53 1.26  20.75 39.00 
2011 5,251  6.45  3.10 3.33  0.65 1.03  5.79 25.75 1.10  20.72 38.53 
2012 5,068  6.23  3.24 3.57  0.85 0.85  5.60 25.99 0.97  20.28 38.65 
Total 81,358  100.00              
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TABLE 2 – Sample Summary, Continued 
Panel B: Assurance Group by Year 
   
        
 Total  
No 
Assurance 
Group 
Compilation 
and Review 
Group 
Director's 
Exam 
Group 
Audit 
Group 
Year # %  % % % % 
2000 7,571 9.31  5.01 1.02 31.41 62.57 
2001 7,390 9.08  4.93 0.96 30.83 63.29 
2002 7,184 8.83  5.22 0.97 30.58 63.22 
2003 7,004 8.61  5.38 1.14 30.48 62.99 
2004 6,794 8.35  5.40 1.16 31.04 62.39 
2005 6,189 7.61  5.85 1.11 33.41 59.62 
2006 6,028 7.41  6.32 1.41 32.22 60.05 
2007 5,929 7.29  6.21 1.50 31.73 60.57 
2008 5,820 7.15  6.55 1.58 31.74 60.14 
2009 5,674 6.97  6.29 1.90 32.34 59.46 
2010 5,456 6.71  6.18 1.59 32.48 59.75 
2011 5,251 6.45  6.44 1.68 32.64 59.25 
2012 5,068 6.23  6.81 1.70 32.56 58.94 
Total 81,358 100.00      
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TABLE 2 - Sample Summary, Continued 
Panel C: Assurance Group by State 
   
        
 Total  
No 
Assurance 
Group 
Compilation 
and Review 
Group 
Director's 
Exam Group Audit Group 
State  #  %  % % % % 
AK 46  0.06  0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
AL 1,597  1.96  0.19 0.38 28.87 70.57 
AR 1,625  2.00  4.37 0.92 27.94 66.77 
AZ 335  0.41  0.60 0.30 4.48 94.63 
CA 2,182  2.68  0.92 0.18 1.05 97.85 
CO 1,548  1.90  0.13 0.52 31.14 68.22 
CT 355  0.44  0.00 0.28 0.00 99.72 
DC 54  0.07  1.85 0.00 0.00 98.15 
DE 122  0.15  0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
FL 2,438  3.00  0.16 0.90 6.60 92.33 
GA 3,164  3.89  0.32 0.25 3.19 96.24 
HI 28  0.03  0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
IA 4,579  5.63  2.86 1.11 64.80 31.23 
ID 144  0.18  0.00 0.00 13.19 86.81 
IL 7,158  8.80  5.21 1.59 37.18 56.02 
IN 1,300  1.60  0.23 0.08 11.38 88.31 
KS 4,113  5.06  9.43 0.90 68.08 21.59 
KY 2,279  2.80  4.12 0.44 7.24 88.20 
LA 1,590  1.95  1.38 0.00 4.53 94.09 
MA 1,474  1.81  0.20 0.34 1.22 98.24 
MD 595  0.73  0.00 0.17 2.02 97.82 
ME 175  0.22  0.57 0.00 2.29 97.14 
MI 1,475  1.81  1.36 2.51 12.54 83.59 
MN 5,276  6.48  5.71 0.80 65.01 28.49 
MO 3,803  4.67  19.98 3.60 40.92 35.50 
MS 967  1.19  4.24 2.07 21.10 72.60 
MT 856  1.05  31.54 2.69 42.41 23.36 
NC 650  0.80  0.00 0.31 0.31 99.38 
ND 1,139  1.40  48.90 3.07 31.26 16.77 
NE 2,958  3.64  2.40 0.34 83.27 14.00 
NH 199  0.24  0.00 1.01 0.00 98.99 
NJ 720  0.88  0.14 0.14 7.22 92.50 
(Table 2, Panel C continues on the next page.)   
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TABLE 2 – Sample Summary, Continued 
Panel C: Assurance Group by State    
        
 Total  
No 
Assurance 
Group 
Compilation 
and Review 
Group 
Director's 
Exam Group Audit Group 
State  #  %  % % % % 
NM 520  0.64  1.92 0.58 9.62 87.88 
NV 206  0.25  0.49 0.49 4.37 94.66 
NY 999  1.23  0.70 0.40 14.51 84.38 
OH 2,039  2.51  4.02 2.70 18.78 74.50 
OK 3,125  3.84  3.36 0.67 70.37 25.60 
OR 315  0.39  2.22 1.59 1.59 94.60 
PA 1,781  2.19  0.90 0.11 3.76 95.23 
RI 24  0.03  0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
SC 704  0.87  2.56 0.28 9.52 87.64 
SD 917  1.13  40.24 4.91 30.21 24.65 
TN 1,998  2.46  0.35 0.25 5.71 93.69 
TX 7,188  8.84  4.17 1.46 23.25 71.12 
UT 371  0.46  2.70 0.54 9.97 86.79 
VA 962  1.18  0.94 0.31 2.08 96.67 
VT 155  0.19  0.00 7.74 0.00 92.26 
WA 721  0.89  5.13 4.44 9.15 81.28 
WI 3,181  3.91  16.82 5.82 43.85 33.51 
WV 736  0.90  0.00 0.00 0.41 99.59 
WY 472  0.58  14.62 1.27 26.27 57.84 
Total 81,358  100.00      
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TABLE 2 - Sample Summary, Continued 
Panel D: Assurance Group by Federal Reserve District 
Federal Reserve 
District 
Total  
No Assurance 
Group 
Compilation and 
Review Group 
Director's Exam 
Group Audit Group 
 #  %  % % % % 
1 Boston 2,290  2.81  0.17 0.87 0.96 97.99 
2 New York 1,584  1.95  0.51 0.32 12.44 86.74 
3 Philadelphia 1,679  2.06  0.95 0.12 2.56 96.37 
4 Cleveland 3,455  4.25  2.95 1.65 12.36 83.04 
5 Richmond 3,645  4.48  0.77 0.22 2.85 96.16 
6 Atlanta 10,057  12.36  0.34 0.46 8.57 90.63 
7 Chicago 14,441  17.75  5.92 1.95 40.34 51.80 
8 St Louis 8,571  10.53  8.05 1.87 29.16 60.93 
9 Minneapolis 9,297  11.43  17.11 2.02 54.67 26.19 
10 Kansas City 13,924  17.11  7.20 1.18 63.32 28.30 
11 Dallas 8,067  9.92  4.00 1.30 21.73 72.96 
12 San Francisco 4,348  5.34  1.77 1.03 4.00 93.19 
Total 81,358  100.00      
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Note: Descriptive statistics are calculated based on 81,358 bank-years representing 8,878 
individual banks over the period 2000-2012. Definitions of all variables are provided in 
Appendix B 
  
TABLE 3 - Descriptive Statistics 
 
N=81,358        
Variable Name Mean SD Min 25% 50% 75% Max 
Audit 0.6114 0.4874 0 0 1 1 1 
IC_Exam 0.3172 0.4654 0 0 0 1 1 
Review_Comp 0.0133 0.1145 0 0 0 0 1 
FirstTimeAudit 0.0147 0.1203 0 0 0 0 1 
DLLP 0.0000 0.0039 -0.0480 -0.0014 -0.0001 0.0011 0.0601 
JMBE 0.0579 0.2335 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Loss_Avoid 0.0326 0.1776 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Size 132647 107600 2074 51405 98122 183499 499928 
Age 69.7787 41.4640 2 27 81 103 143 
Loans 0.6282 0.1535 0.1904 0.5351 0.6473 0.7417 0.9059 
Deposits 0.8375 0.0687 0.5476 0.8079 0.8529 0.8860 0.9283 
Employees 41 38 1 16 30 54 1350 
Leverage 0.1078 0.0392 -0.0906 0.0845 0.0987 0.1204 0.9482 
Assur_Lvl 7.2869 2.0363 1 6 8 9 9 
Tier1 0.1465 0.0839 0.0000 0.1062 0.1341 0.1781 0.4730 
ΔTier1 0.0109 0.0553 -0.1821 -0.0066 0.0002 0.0118 0.2476 
NPL 0.0094 0.0130 0.0000 0.0013 0.0049 0.0120 0.0737 
LLP 0.0049 0.0077 -0.0028 0.0008 0.0025 0.0054 0.0482 
ChargeOff 0.0029 0.0049 0.0000 0.0003 0.0012 0.0032 0.0294 
ROA 0.0100 0.0111 -0.0389 0.0063 0.0117 0.0163 0.0317 
Loss 0.1069 0.3090 0 0 0 0 1 
LoantoDep 0.7563 0.1949 0.2466 0.6329 0.7695 0.8899 1.2129 
LoanDepIntRatio 3.1610 1.8992 0.8701 1.9520 2.6134 3.7133 11.8462 
Het_Loans 0.7668 0.1321 0.3338 0.6952 0.7850 0.8604 0.9911 
LoanC 0.1461 0.0982 0.0000 0.0770 0.1270 0.1934 0.5014 
LoanR 0.6600 0.1918 0.1365 0.5365 0.6863 0.8038 0.9886 
LoanA 0.0868 0.1336 0.0000 0.0000 0.0183 0.1232 0.5812 
LoanI 0.0892 0.0820 0.0004 0.0308 0.0661 0.1213 0.4244 
ΔCashFlows 0.0008 0.0090 -0.9798 -0.0015 0.0008 0.0032 0.2313 
ΔROA 0.0002 0.0083 -0.0327 -0.0025 0.0000 0.0026 0.0341 
ΔLoans 0.1110 0.2748 -0.2258 -0.0107 0.0564 0.1406 1.9097 
ΔDeposits 0.1064 0.2388 -0.1732 0.0029 0.0540 0.1241 1.6637 
ΔHetLoans -0.0031 0.0879 -0.3526 -0.0224 0.0036 0.0285 0.3149 
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TABLE 4 - Differences in Assurance Level Groups 
Panel A: Director's Exam and Audit 
 
Director's Exam 
(N=25,806) Audit (N=49,740) 
Test of 
Differences 
Variable Name Mean Mean MeanDiff 
DLLP 0.0000 0.0000 *** 
JMBE 0.0620 0.0560 *** 
Loss_Avoid 0.0270 0.0360 *** 
Size 85000 160000 *** 
Age 85.0850 60.2050 *** 
Loans 0.6080 0.6410 *** 
Deposits 0.8450 0.8330 *** 
Employees 0.1100 0.1060 *** 
Leverage 0.7210 0.7780 *** 
Tier1 0.1530 0.1420 *** 
ΔTier1 0.0140 0.0090 *** 
NPL 0.0080 0.0100 *** 
LLP 0.0040 0.0050 *** 
ChargeOff 0.0000 0.0010 *** 
ROA 0.0120 0.0090 *** 
Loss 0.0590 0.1350 *** 
LoantoDep 26.5490 49.8210 *** 
LoanDepIntRatio 0.0030 0.0030 *** 
Het_Loans 0.7550 0.7730 *** 
LoanC 0.1470 0.1460  
LoanR 0.5790 0.7110 *** 
LoanA 0.1560 0.0430 *** 
LoanI 0.1010 0.0830 *** 
ΔCashFlows 3.0820 3.1950 *** 
ΔROA 0.0000 0.0010 *** 
ΔLoans 0.0640 0.1410 *** 
ΔDeposits 0.0640 0.1330 *** 
ΔHetLoans -0.0050 -0.0020 *** 
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TABLE 4 - Differences in Assurance Level Groups 
Panel B: Compilation and Review and Director's Exam 
 
Compilation and 
Review (N=1081) 
Director's Exam 
(N=25,806) Test of Differences 
Variable Name Mean Mean MeanDiff 
DLLP 0.0000 0.0000  
JMBE 0.0660 0.0620  
Loss_Avoid 0.0210 0.0270  
Size 110000 85000 *** 
Age 79.6890 85.0850 *** 
Loans 0.6330 0.6080 *** 
Deposits 0.8450 0.8450  
Employees 0.1070 0.1100 ** 
Leverage 0.7510 0.7210 *** 
Tier1 0.1500 0.1530  
ΔTier1 0.0080 0.0140 *** 
NPL 0.0110 0.0080 *** 
LLP 0.0050 0.0040 *** 
ChargeOff 0.0000 0.0000 * 
ROA 0.0100 0.0120 *** 
Loss 0.0970 0.0590 *** 
LoantoDep 33.4110 26.5490 *** 
LoanDepIntRatio 0.0030 0.0030 *** 
Het_Loans 0.7690 0.7550 *** 
LoanC 0.1430 0.1470  
LoanR 0.6430 0.5790 *** 
LoanA 0.1090 0.1560 *** 
LoanI 0.0850 0.1010 *** 
ΔCashFlows 3.3240 3.0820 *** 
ΔROA -0.0010 0.0000 ** 
ΔLoans 0.0750 0.0640 ** 
ΔDeposits 0.0770 0.0640 *** 
ΔHetLoans 0.0010 -0.0050 ** 
Note: This table presents comparisons of the means for bank-year observations that fall into 
different assurance groups. Columns (1) and (2) compare the means of the Compilation and 
Review group (Comp_Review=1) to those of the Directors' Examination group (IC_Exam=1). 
The p-value is from a test of difference in means between the two groups. 
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TABLE 4 - Differences in Assurance Level Groups  
Panel C: No Assurance and Compilation and Review  
 
 
No Assurance 
(N=4,731) 
Compilation and 
Review (N=1,081) 
Test of 
Differences  
Variable Name Mean Mean MeanDiff  
DLLP 0.0000 0.0000   
JMBE 0.0590 0.0660   
Loss_Avoid 0.0260 0.0210   
Size 90000 110000 ***  
Age 84.6740 79.6890 ***  
Loans 0.6070 0.6330 ***  
Deposits 0.8460 0.8450   
Employees 0.1130 0.1070 ***  
Leverage 0.7170 0.7510 ***  
Tier1 0.1590 0.1500 ***  
ΔTier1 0.0120 0.0080 **  
NPL 0.0090 0.0110 ***  
LLP 0.0040 0.0050 ***  
ChargeOff 0.0000 0.0000   
ROA 0.0110 0.0100 ***  
Loss 0.0780 0.0970 **  
LoantoDep 27.1410 33.4110 ***  
LoanDepIntRatio 0.0030 0.0030 ***  
Het_Loans 0.7590 0.7690 **  
LoanC 0.1440 0.1430   
LoanR 0.5690 0.6430 ***  
LoanA 0.1700 0.1090 ***  
LoanI 0.0960 0.0850 ***  
ΔCashFlows 3.1940 3.3240 **  
ΔROA -0.0010 -0.0010   
ΔLoans 0.0620 0.0750 **  
ΔDeposits 0.0630 0.0770 ***  
ΔHetLoans -0.0040 0.0010 *   
Note: This table presents comparisons of the means for bank-year observations that fall into 
different assurance groups. Columns (1) and (2) compare the means of the No Assurance 
group  to those of the Compilation and Review group (Comp_Review=1). The p-value is from 
a test of difference in means between the two groups. 
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TABLE 5 - Determinants of Level of Assurance 
 
None=0, Review, Directors 
Exam, Audit=1 
 
None, Review=0, Directors 
Exam, Audit=1 
 
None, Review, Directors 
Exam=0, Audit=1 
  coef p-value  coef p-value  coef p-value 
Intercept -5.338 0.000 ***  -2.566 0.053 *  -17.753 0.000 *** 
Size 0.151 0.036 **  0.048 0.452   0.345 0.000 *** 
Age 0.000 0.631   0.000 0.931   -0.007 0.000 *** 
Loans -5.710 0.001 ***  -2.616 0.078 *  -3.843 0.017 ** 
Deposits 3.175 0.025 **  0.702 0.576   2.698 0.039 ** 
Employees -0.075 0.339   -0.101 0.148   0.225 0.000 *** 
Leverage 0.332 0.734   -0.047 0.960   4.173 0.000 *** 
Assur_Group 2.011 0.000 ***  2.017 0.000 ***  4.390 0.000 *** 
Tier1 -0.078 0.742   -0.078 0.742   -0.078 0.742  
ΔTier1 1.202 0.001 ***  1.202 0.001 ***  1.202 0.001 *** 
NPL -4.185 0.000 ***  -4.185 0.000 ***  -4.185 0.000 *** 
LLP 4.412 0.178   4.412 0.178   4.412 0.178  
ChargeOffs -8.723 0.079 *  -8.723 0.079 *  -8.723 0.079 * 
ROA -14.066 0.000 ***  -8.596 0.007 **  -15.547 0.000 *** 
Loss -0.171 0.131    -0.088 0.412    0.221 0.006 ** 
LoantoDep 4.736 0.001 **  2.116 0.087 *  3.149 0.020 ** 
LoanDepIntRatio -0.011 0.152    -0.011 0.152    -0.011 0.152   
HetLoans 0.333 0.135    0.333 0.135    0.333 0.135   
            
(Table 5 is continued on the next page)       
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TABLE 5 - Determinants of Level of Assurance (Cont.) 
            
 
None=0, Review, Directors 
Exam, Audit=1 
 
None, Review=0, Directors 
Exam, Audit=1 
 
None, Review, Directors Exam=0, 
Audit=1 
  coef p-value  coef p-value  coef p-value 
LoanC 0.069 0.839    0.069 0.839    0.069 0.839   
LoanR 0.209 0.509    0.209 0.509    0.209 0.509   
LoanA -0.249 0.497    0.100 0.784    -1.506 0.000 *** 
LoanI 1.058 0.004 **  1.058 0.004 **  1.058 0.004 ** 
ΔCashFlows 2.369 0.663    2.369 0.663    2.369 0.663   
ΔLoans 0.386 0.010 **  0.445 0.001 **  1.019 0.000 *** 
ΔDeposits 0.683 0.000 ***  0.683 0.000 ***  0.683 0.000 *** 
N 68,773  68,773  68,773 
State FE Included  Included  Included 
Year FE Included  Included  Included 
FedDistrict FE Included  Included  Included 
Pseudo R2 0.553  0.553  0.553 
            
Note: I estimate the model using a partial proportion odds model with robust standard errors clustered by bank. All independent 
variables are measured at year t-1. All variables are defined in Appendix B. All continuous variables have been winsorized at the 
1% and 99% level. P-values are two-tailed. *** p<0.010, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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TABLE 6 - Level of Assurance and Financial Reporting Quality 
   Discretionary Loan Loss 
Provision 
 Just Meet or Beat Prior Year 
Earnings 
 
Loss Avoidance      
  Pred coef p-value   coef  p-value   coef p-value 
Intercept ?  -0.310 0.000 ***  -2.867 0.001 ***  -3.318 0.000 *** 
Audit -  -0.133 0.000 ***  -0.753 0.032 **  -0.834 0.077 * 
IC_Exam -  -0.056 0.000 ***  -0.507 0.028 **  -0.194 0.307  
Review_Comp -  -0.000 0.034 **  0.054 0.414   -0.293 0.234  
Size ?  -0.017 0.000 ***  0.081 0.012 **  0.282 0.000 *** 
Leverage ?  -0.568 0.006 ***  -1.199 0.187   -3.199 0.003 *** 
Lag_Assur_Lvl -  0.015 0.000 ***  0.111 0.022   0.091 0.122  
Δ Assur_Lvl ?  0.017 0.000 ***  0.129 0.011 **  0.113 0.073 * 
Tier1 ?  -0.487 0.000 ***  -0.690 0.132   0.381 0.290  
Δ Tier 1 ?  -0.262 0.041 **  -0.952 0.211   4.065 0.000 *** 
NPL -  -8.120 0.000 ***  -17.890 0.000 ***  -10.068 0.000 *** 
LLP ?  89.233 0.000 ***  -103.707 0.000 ***  -56.428 0.000 *** 
ROA -  -2.892 0.000 ***  153.501 0.000 ***  -18.353 0.000 *** 
Het_Loans -  0.352 0.000 ***  -0.739 0.013 **  -1.056 0.007 *** 
              
(Table 7 is continued on the next page)           
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TABLE 6 - Level of Assurance and Financial Reporting Quality (Cont.) 
              
   Discretionary Loan 
Loss Provision 
 Just Meet or Beat Prior 
Year Earnings 
 
Loss Avoidance      
  Pred coef p-value   coef  p-value   coef p-value 
LoanC -  -0.351 0.000 ***  -0.809 0.033 **  -1.463 0.002 *** 
Δ CashFlows ?  2.768 0.000 ***  148.194 0.000 ***  53.777 0.000 *** 
Δ Loans +  0.072 0.000 ***  0.068 0.398   -0.686 0.000 *** 
Δ Dep +  0.013 0.255   -0.511 0.038 **  0.375 0.031 ** 
Number of observations   81,358   36,644   10,941  
Year FE   Included  Included  Included 
FedDistrict FE   Included  Included  Included 
State FE   Included  Included  Included 
Adjusted R2   0.857     
Area under the ROC Curve     0.836  0.726 
              
F-Test           
Audit=IC_Exam   ***  ***  *** 
IC_Exam=Review_Comp   **  ***  NS 
Audit=Review_Comp   ***  ***  *** 
              
Note: I estimate model (1) (models (2) and (3)) using ordinary least squares (logistic) regression with robust standard errors 
clustered by bank (Peterson 2009). All variables are defined in Appendix B. For ease of interpretation, all coefficients in the DLLP 
model have been multiplied by 100. All continuous variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. P-values are one-
tailed. *** p<0.010, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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TABLE 7 - Assurance in Single Bank and Multibank Bank Holding Companies 
          
   Obs %  
% No 
Assurance 
% 
Review/ 
Comp 
% 
Directors 
Exam 
% 
Audit 
Single Bank BHC  68,073 83.67  6.05 1.40 32.30 60.24 
Multibank BHC         
 Same Assurance  10,432 12.82  2.69 0.40 25.37 71.53 
 Differing Assurance  2,853 3.51  11.60 2.91 40.97 44.51 
Total  81,358 100.00      
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TABLE 8 - Determinants of Level of Assurance No Multi-bank BHCs 
 
None=0, Review, Directors 
Exam, Audit=1 
 
None, Review=0, Directors 
Exam, Audit=1 
 
None, Review, Directors 
Exam=0, Audit=1 
  coef p-value  coef p-value  coef p-value 
Intercept -5.892 0.000 ***   -3.305 0.018 **   -17.452 0.000 *** 
Size 0.175 0.022 **  0.058 0.382    0.308 0.000 *** 
Age -0.002 0.118    0.000 0.975    -0.008 0.000 *** 
Loans -5.423 0.003 **  -2.819 0.075 *  -3.662 0.033 ** 
Deposits 3.408 0.018 **  1.122 0.393    2.664 0.056 * 
Employees -0.080 0.336    -0.092 0.203    0.292 0.000 *** 
Leverage 0.465 0.650    0.115 0.910    4.833 0.000 *** 
Assur_Group 1.978 0.000 ***  1.994 0.000 ***  4.307 0.000 *** 
Tier1 0.302 0.225    0.302 0.225    0.302 0.225   
ΔTier1 1.469 0.000 ***  1.469 0.000 ***  1.469 0.000 *** 
NPL -3.478 0.007 **  -3.478 0.007 **  -3.478 0.007 ** 
LLP 4.940 0.167    4.940 0.167    4.940 0.167   
ChargeOffs -10.670 0.044 **  -10.670 0.044 **  -10.670 0.044 ** 
ROA -19.541 0.000 ***  -13.384 0.000 ***  -20.919 0.000 *** 
Loss -0.205 0.097 *  -0.085 0.474    0.191 0.026 ** 
LoantoDep 4.589 0.002 **  2.412 0.066 *  2.873 0.047 ** 
LoanDepIntRatio -0.006 0.460    -0.006 0.460    -0.006 0.460   
HetLoans 0.369 0.119    0.369 0.119    0.369 0.119   
            
(Table 10 is continued on the next page)       
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TABLE 8- Determinants of Level of Assurance No Multi-bank BHCs (Cont.) 
               
 
None=0, Review, Directors 
Exam, Audit=1 
 
None, Review=0, Directors 
Exam, Audit=1 
 
None, Review, Directors 
Exam=0, Audit=1 
  coef p-value  coef p-value  coef p-value 
LoanC 0.075 0.842    0.075 0.842    0.075 0.842   
LoanR 0.306 0.373    0.306 0.373    0.306 0.373   
LoanA -0.060 0.879    0.315 0.421    -1.451 0.000 *** 
LoanI 1.217 0.003 **  1.217 0.003 **  1.217 0.003 ** 
ΔCashFlows 3.894 0.505    3.894 0.505    3.894 0.505   
ΔLoans 0.921 0.000 ***  0.921 0.000 ***  0.921 0.000 *** 
ΔDeposits 0.270 0.186    0.232 0.216    1.005 0.000 *** 
N 56,748  56,748  56,748 
State FE Included  Included  Included 
Year FE Included  Included  Included 
FedDistrict FE Included  Included  Included 
Pseudo R2 0.548  0.548  0.548 
Note: I estimate the model using a partial proportion odds model with robust standard errors clustered by bank (Peterson 2009). All 
independent variables are measured at year t-1. All variables are defined in Appendix B. All continuous variables have been 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. P-values are two-tailed. *** p<0.010, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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TABLE 9 – Just Meet or Beat Prior Year Earnings Threshold Sensitivity 
              
   Just Meet or Beat 
1 Bin Width 
 Just Meet or Beat 
2 Bin Widths 
 Just Meet or Beat 
3 Bin Widths      
  Pred coef p-value   coef  p-value   coef p-value 
Intercept ?  -5.339 0.000 ***  -3.116 0.000 ***  -2.759 0.000 *** 
Audit -  -2.126 0.002 **  -1.294 0.006 **  -0.932 0.018 ** 
IC_Exam -  -1.407 0.002 **  -0.869 0.005 **  -0.630 0.015 ** 
Review_Comp -  -0.189 0.320   -0.031 0.461   0.020 0.471  
Size ?  0.195 0.001 ***  0.157 0.000 ***  0.167 0.000 *** 
Leverage ?  -1.222 0.288   -5.494 0.001 ***  -6.105 0.000 *** 
Lag_Assur_Lvl -  0.282 0.002 **  0.176 0.007 **  0.115 0.029 ** 
Δ Assur_Lvl ?  0.259 0.005 **  0.202 0.002 **  0.135 0.014 ** 
Tier1 ?  -0.409 0.360   0.673 0.219   1.161 0.063 * 
Δ Tier 1 ?  -0.621 0.371   0.235 0.439   0.557 0.337  
NPL -  -12.517 0.017 **  -4.959 0.134   -5.312 0.082 * 
LLP ?  -70.929 0.000 ***  -88.928 0.000 ***  -81.517 0.000 *** 
Het_Loans -  -0.988 0.025 **  -0.968 0.006 **  -0.771 0.014 ** 
LoanC -  -1.233 0.037 **  -1.043 0.023 **  -0.967 0.020 ** 
Δ ROA -  110.944 0.000 ***  127.723 0.000 ***  137.848 0.000 *** 
Δ CashFlows ?  83.747 0.000 ***  103.178 0.000 ***  108.899 0.000 *** 
Δ Loans +  0.154 0.345   -0.076 0.409   0.075 0.395  
Δ Dep +  -1.250 0.003 **  -0.695 0.028 **  -0.815 0.006 ** 
Δ Het_Loans ?  -0.118 0.426   -0.016 0.487   0.275 0.261  
N   31,269   31,585   31,585  
Year FE   Included  Included  Included 
FedDistrict FE   Included  Included  Included 
State FE   Included  Included  Included 
Area under the ROC Curve 0.798  0.813  0.824 
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TABLE 9 – Just Meet or Beat Prior Year Earnings Threshold Sensitivity (Cont.) 
              
F-Test           
Audit=IC_Exam  ***  **  ** 
IC_Exam=Review_Comp ***  ***  *** 
Audit=Review_Comp **  ***  *** 
              
Note: I estimate the models using logistic regression with robust standard errors clustered by bank (Peterson 2009). All variables are 
defined in Appendix B. All continuous variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. P-values are one-tailed. *** 
p<0.010, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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TABLE 10 - Loss Avoidance Threshold Sensitivity 
              
   Loss Avoidance  
1 Bin Width 
 Loss Avoidance  
2 Bin Widths 
 Loss Avoidance  
3 Bin Widths      
  Prediction coef p-value   coef  p-value   coef p-value 
Intercept ?  -5.415 0.000 ***  -4.231 0.000 ***  -3.435 0.000 *** 
Audit -  -0.947 0.161   -1.238 0.056 *  -0.917 0.082 * 
IC_Exam -  -0.340 0.299   -0.531 0.153   -0.391 0.184  
Review_Comp -  -0.813 0.159   -0.471 0.204   -0.369 0.203  
Size ?  0.205 0.008 **  0.218 0.000 ***  0.270 0.000 *** 
Leverage ?  -2.062 0.114   -2.550 0.040 **  -2.630 0.019 ** 
Lag_Assur_Lvl -  0.129 0.161   0.147 0.080 *  0.091 0.153  
Δ Assur_Lvl ?  0.100 0.214   0.124 0.116   0.088 0.158  
Tier1 ?  0.602 0.277   0.558 0.260   0.257 0.363  
Δ Tier 1 ?  3.384 0.004 **  3.658 0.000 ***  3.649 0.000 *** 
NPL -  -10.899 0.007 **  -11.693 0.000 ***  -8.828 0.000 *** 
LLP ?  -56.682 0.000 ***  -57.974 0.000 ***  -60.698 0.000 *** 
Het_Loans -  0.324 0.319   -0.379 0.225   -0.860 0.029 ** 
LoanC -  -0.794 0.166   -0.958 0.054 *  -1.107 0.018 ** 
Δ ROA -  -16.041 0.017 **  -15.506 0.003 **  -17.990 0.000 *** 
Δ CashFlows ?  37.880 0.000 ***  47.449 0.000 ***  53.071 0.000 *** 
Δ Loans +  -0.617 0.014 **  -0.687 0.001 ***  -0.761 0.000 *** 
Δ Dep +  0.436 0.093 *  0.377 0.071 *  0.440 0.026 ** 
Δ Het_Loans ?  -1.243 0.029 **  -0.435 0.204   -0.443 0.150  
Number of observations  10,870   10,909   10,918  
Year FE   Included  Included  Included 
FedDistrict FE   Included  Included  Included 
State FE   Included  Included  Included 
Area under the ROC Curve  0.730  0.730  0.726 
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TABLE 10 - Loss Avoidance Threshold Sensitivity (Cont.)  
              
F-Test           
Audit=IC_Exam   *  **  ** 
IC_Exam=Review_Comp  NS  NS  NS 
Audit=Review_Comp  NS  NS  NS 
Note: I estimate the models using logistic regression with robust standard errors clustered by bank (Peterson 2009). All variables are 
defined in Appendix B. All continuous variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. P-values are one-tailed. *** 
p<0.010, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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TABLE 11 - Just Meet or Beat Excluding Banks with Large Negative Changes in 
Earnings 
      
   Just Meet or Beat Prior Year 
Earnings    
  Prediction coef p-value 
Intercept ?  -2.924 0.000 *** 
Audit -  -1.140 0.012 ** 
IC_Exam -  -0.793 0.008 ** 
Review_Comp -  -0.012 0.484   
Size ?  0.142 0.001 ** 
Leverage ?  -6.250 0.000 *** 
Lag_Assur_Lvl -  0.144 0.019 ** 
Δ Assur_Lvl ?  0.177 0.006 ** 
Tier1 ?  1.853 0.018 ** 
Δ Tier 1 ?  -0.783 0.304   
NPL -  -5.989 0.078 * 
LLP ?  -74.631 0.000 *** 
Het_Loans -  -0.963 0.006 ** 
LoanC -  -1.187 0.010 ** 
Δ ROA -  117.007 0.000 *** 
Δ CashFlows ?  88.412 0.000 *** 
Δ Loans +  0.093 0.386   
Δ Dep +  -0.708 0.024 ** 
Δ Het_Loans ?   -0.020 0.484   
Number of observations   25,963  
Year FE   Included 
FedDistrict FE   Included 
State FE   Included 
Area under the ROC Curve   0.770 
      
F-Test      
Audit=IC_Exam   ** 
IC_Exam=Review_Comp   *** 
Audit=Review_Comp   ** 
      
Note: I estimate the model using logistic regression with robust standard errors clustered by 
bank (Peterson 2009). All variables are defined in Appendix B. All continuous variables have 
been winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. P-values are one-tailed. *** p<0.010, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.10 
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TABLE 12 - Loss Avoidance Excluding Banks with Large Losses 
      
   
Loss Avoidance    
  Prediction coef p-value 
Intercept ?  -1.628 0.025 ** 
Audit -  -0.317 0.038 ** 
IC_Exam -  -0.031 0.041 ** 
Review_Comp -  -0.120 0.208   
Size ?  0.086 0.049 ** 
Leverage ?  -0.983 0.228   
Lag_Assur_Lvl -  0.031 0.346   
Δ Assur_Lvl ?  0.066 0.200   
Tier1 ?  0.668 0.213   
Δ Tier 1 ?  3.618 0.000 *** 
NPL -  -9.527 0.000 *** 
LLP ?  -51.744 0.000 *** 
Het_Loans -  -0.522 0.120   
LoanC -  -1.031 0.024 ** 
Δ ROA -  -21.138 0.000 *** 
Δ CashFlows ?  38.907 0.000 *** 
Δ Loans +  -0.259 0.098 * 
Δ Dep +  0.361 0.064 * 
Δ Het_Loans ?   -0.252 0.274   
Number of observations   7,398  
Year FE   Included 
FedDistrict FE   Included 
State FE   Included 
Area under the ROC Curve   0.726 
      
F-Test      
Audit=IC_Exam   *** 
IC_Exam=Review_Comp   ** 
Audit=Review_Comp   ** 
      
Note: I estimate the model using logistic regression with robust standard errors clustered by 
bank (Peterson 2009). All variables are defined in Appendix B. All continuous variables have 
been winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. P-values are one-tailed. *** p<0.010, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.10 
  
 
7
7
 
 
TABLE 13 - Level of Assurance and Financial Reporting Quality Dropping Prior Year Assurance Variables 
   Discretionary Loan 
Loss Provision 
 Just Meet or Beat Prior 
Year Earnings 
 
Loss Avoidance      
  Pred coef p-value   coef  p-value   coef p-value 
Intercept ?  -0.560 0.000 ***  -2.903 0.000 ***  -3.101 0.000 *** 
Audit -  -0.021 0.000 ***  -1.125 0.013 **  -0.053 0.056 * 
IC_Exam -  -0.004 0.000 ***  -0.778 0.010 **  0.291 0.396   
Review_Comp -  -0.006 0.034 **  -0.015 0.480    -0.051 0.445   
Size ?  -0.018 0.000 ***  0.151 0.001 ***  0.275 0.000 *** 
Leverage ?  -0.564 0.006 ***  -5.444 0.001 ***  -3.172 0.003 ** 
Tier1 ?  -0.481 0.000 ***  0.741 0.190    0.423 0.269   
Δ Tier 1 ?  -0.263 0.041 **  -0.192 0.449    4.011 0.000 *** 
NPL -  -8.112 0.000 ***  -4.984 0.122    -10.043 0.000 *** 
LLP ?  89.232 0.000 ***  -81.793 0.000 ***  -56.388 0.000 *** 
ROA -  -2.896 0.000 ***  127.225 0.000 ***  -1.460 0.002 ** 
Het_Loans -  0.352 0.000 ***  -1.023 0.004 **  -18.378 0.000 *** 
LoanC -  -0.351 0.000 ***  -1.166 0.011 **  -1.062 0.007 ** 
Δ CashFlows ?  2.779 0.000 ***  98.273 0.000 ***  53.859 0.000 *** 
Δ Loans +  0.073 0.000 ***  0.049 0.438    -0.684 0.000 *** 
Δ Dep +  0.013 0.255   -0.801 0.012 **  0.371 0.033 ** 
Δ Het_Loans ?  -0.029 0.093 *  0.003 0.497    -0.261 0.240   
Number of observations   81,358   36,644   10,941  
Year FE   Included  Included  Included 
FedDistrict FE   Included  Included  Included 
State FE   Included  Included  Included 
Adjusted R2   0.860     
Area under the ROC Curve     0.812  0.726 
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TABLE 13 - Level of Assurance and Financial Reporting Quality Dropping Prior Year Assurance Variables (Cont.) 
          
F-Test          
Audit=IC_Exam   ***  **  *** 
IC_Exam=Review_Comp   **  ***  NS 
Audit=Review_Comp   ***  ***  NS 
              
Note: I estimate model (1) (models (2) and (3)) using ordinary least squares (logistic) regression with robust standard errors 
clustered by bank. All variables are defined in Appendix A. All continuous variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
P-values are one-tailed. *** p<0.010, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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FIGURE 1 - Mean Assurance Level by State 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map illustrating the mean assurance level by US state from 2000 through 2012. Darker shades indicate higher levels of assurance. The 
map was generated using the STATA spmap command. I am grateful to the US National Weather Service for providing the shapefile.  
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FIGURE 2 - Mean Assurance Group by Federal Reserve District 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map illustrating the mean assurance level by US Federal Reserve District from 2000 through 2012. Darker shades indicate higher levels 
of assurance. The map was generated using the STATA spmap command. I am grateful to Keith Taylor at the St. Louis Federal Reserve 
Bank for providing the shapefile. 
